Category: Hard Nosed Folks Both Good & Bad
Medal of Honor, Vietnam War Robert Howard Medal of Honor: Oral Histories Medal of Honor: Oral Histories
SOG’S FIERCEST WARRIOR: COLONEL ROBERT L. HOWARD
Medal of Honor: Oral Histories
Medal of Honor: Oral Histories
By Maj. John L. Plaster, USA (Ret)
RECON COMPANY AT COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRAL
In 1968, Robert L. Howard was a 30-year-old sergeant first class and the most physically fit man on our compound. Broad-chested, solid as a lumberjack and mentally tough, he cut an imposing presence. I was among the lucky few Army Special Forces soldiers to have served with Bob Howard in our 60-man Recon Company at Command and Control Central, a top secret Green Beret unit that ran covert missions behind enemy lines. As an element of the secretive Studies and Observations Group (SOG), we did our best to recon, raid, attack and disrupt the enemy’s Ho Chi Minh Trail network in Laos and Cambodia.
UP THERE WITH AMERICA’S GREATEST HEROES
Take all of John Wayne’s films—throw in Clint Eastwood’s, too—and these fictions could not measure up to the real Bob Howard. Officially he was awarded eight Purple Hearts, but he actually was wounded 14 times. Six of the wounds, he decided, weren’t severe enough to be worthy of the award. Keep in mind that for each time he was wounded, there probably were ten times that he was nearly wounded, and you get some idea of his combat service. He was right up there with America’s greatest heroes—Davy Crockett, Alvin York, Audie Murphy, the inspiring example we other Green Berets tried to live up to. “What would Bob Howard do?” many of us asked ourselves when surrounded and outnumbered, just a handful of men to fight off hordes of North Vietnamese.
To call him a legend is no exaggeration. Take the time he was in a chow line at an American base and a Vietnamese terrorist on a motorbike tossed a hand grenade at them. While others leaped for cover, Howard snatched an M-16 from a petrified security guard, dropped to one knee and expertly shot the driver, and then chased the passenger a half-mile and killed him, too.
One night his recon team laid beside an enemy highway in Laos as a convoy rolled past. Running alongside an enemy truck in pitch blackness, he spun an armed claymore mine over his head like a lasso, then threw it among enemy soldiers crammed in the back, detonated it, and ran away to fight another day.
Another time, he was riding in a Huey with Larry White and Robert Clough into Laos, when their pilot unknowingly landed beside two heavily camouflaged enemy helicopters. Fire erupted instantly, riddling their Huey and hitting White three times, knocking him to the ground. Firing back, Howard and Clough jumped out and grabbed White, and their Huey somehow limped back to South Vietnam.
CONSIDER THE RESCUE OF JOE WALKER
“Just knowing Bob Howard was ready to come and get you meant a lot to us,” said recon team leader Lloyd O’Daniels. Consider the rescue of Joe Walker. His recon team and an SOG platoon had been overrun near a major Laotian highway and, seriously wounded, Walker was hiding with a Montagnard soldier, unable to move. Howard inserted a good distance away with a dozen men and, because there were so many enemy present, waited for darkness to sneak into the area. Howard felt among bodies for heartbeats, and checked one figure’s lanky legs, then felt for Joe’s signature horn-rimmed glasses. “You sweet Son of a Gun,” Walker whispered, and Howard took him to safety.
What’s all the more remarkable is that not one of these incidents resulted in any award. Howard was just doing what had to be done, he thought.
“HOPELESS” WAS NOT IN HIS VOCABULARY
Unique in American military history, this Opelika, Alabama native was recommended for the Medal of Honor three times in 13 months for separate combat actions, witnessed by fellow Green Berets. The first came in November 1967. While a larger SOG element destroyed an enemy cache, Howard screened forward and confronted a large enemy force. He killed four enemy soldiers and took out an NVA sniper. Then, “pinned down…with a blazing machine gun only six inches above his head,” he shot and killed an entire NVA gun crew at point-blank range, and then destroyed another machine gun position with a grenade. He so demoralized the enemy force that they withdrew. This Medal of Honor recommendation was downgraded to a Silver Star.
The next incident came a year later. Again accompanying a larger SOG force, he performed magnificently, single-handedly knocking out a PT-76 tank. A day later he wiped out an anti-aircraft gun crew, and afterward rescued the crew of a downed Huey. Repeatedly wounded, he was bleeding from his arms, legs, back and face, but he refused to be evacuated. Again submitted for the Medal of Honor, his recommendation was downgraded, this time to the Distinguished Service Cross.
Just six weeks later, Howard volunteered to accompany a platoon going into Laos in search of a missing recon man, Robert Scherdin. Ambushed by a large enemy force, Howard was badly wounded, his M-16 blown to bits—yet he crawled to the aid of a wounded lieutenant, fought off NVA soldiers with a grenade, then a .45 pistol, and managed to drag the officer away. Having been burned and slashed by shrapnel, we thought we’d never see him again. But he went AWOL from the hospital and came back in pajamas to learn he’d been again submitted for the Medal of Honor. This time it went forward to Washington, with assurances that it would be approved.
Howard did not know the word, “hopeless.” Many years later he explained his mindset during the Medal of Honor operation: “I had one choice: to lay and wait, or keep fighting for my men. If I waited, I gambled that things would get better while I did nothing. If I kept fighting, no matter how painful, I could stack the odds that recovery for my men and a safe exodus were achievable.”
Although eventually sent home, he came back yet again, to spend with us the final months before his Medal of Honor ceremony. By then he had served more than 5 years in Vietnam. Why so much time in Vietnam? “I guess it’s because I want to help in any way I can,” Howard explained. “I may as well be here where I can use my training; and besides, I have to do it – it’s the way I feel about my job.”
THE WARRIOR TRADITION
The warrior ethic came naturally to Bob Howard. His father and four uncles had all been paratroopers in World War Two. Of them, two died in combat and the other three succumbed to wounds after the war. To support his mother and maternal grandparents, he and his sister picked cotton. He also learned old-fashioned Southern civility, removing his hat for any lady and answering, “Yes, ma’am.”
He also possessed a deep sense of honor and justice, and lived by his unspoken warrior’s code, with the priorities mission, men, and his own interests coming last. He absolutely fit the bill as a leader you’d follow through hell’s gates – IF you could keep up with him. A hard-charging physical fitness advocate, he even had our Montagnard tribesmen running and doing calisthenics.
After draping the Medal of Honor around Howard’s neck, President Nixon asked him what he wanted to do the rest of that memorable day – lunch with the president, a tour of the White House, almost anything. Howard asked simply to be taken to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to share his thoughts with others who had gone before him. Tragically, the U.S. media, reflecting the anti-war sentiments of that period, said not one word about Howard or his valiant deeds, although by the time he received the Medal of Honor he was America’s most highly decorated serviceman.
Despite the lack of recognition, Howard went on serving to the best of his ability. He was the training officer at the Army’s Airborne School, then he was a company commander in the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Ft. Lewis, Washington. He continued to excel at everything he did, making Distinguished Honor Graduate in his Officer Advance Course class.
As the officer-in-charge of Special Forces training at Camp Mackall, near Ft. Bragg, N.C., and later, commanding the Mountain Ranger Training Camp at Dahlonega, Georgia, he did his utmost to inspire young students. Howard’s frame of reference was SOG—hard combat, the toughest kind against terrible odds with impossible missions. He knew good men would die or fail in combat without martial skills, tactical knowledge and physical conditioning. He was famous for leading runs and long-distance rucksack marches— stronger than men half his age, usually he outran entire classes of students. A whole generation of Army Special Forces and Rangers earned their qualifications under his shining example, with some graduates among the senior leaders of today’s Special Forces and Ranger units.
His highest assignment was commander of Special Forces Detachment, Korea. He might have gone higher but he dared to publicly suggest that American POWs had been left in enemy hands, and was willing to testify to that before Congress in 1986. After he retired as a full colonel, he went through multiple surgeries to try to correct the many injuries he’d suffered over the years.
But he could not stop helping GIs. He spent another 20 years with the Department of Veterans Affairs, helping disabled vets. He had a reputation for rankling his superiors as an unapologetic advocate of veterans.
THIS HUMBLE KNIGHT BELONGS TO HISTORY
His spirit never waned. In 2004 I sat with Green Berets of the 1st Special Forces Group at Ft. Lewis, Wash., who laughed and cheered when he joked about still being tough enough to take on any two men in the audience—not one raised his hand. After retiring from the VA, Col. Howard often visited with American servicemen to speak about his combat experiences, making five trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the fall of 2009, he visited troops in Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo.
Despite increasing pain and sickness, on Veterans Day 2009 he kept his word to attend a memorial ceremony, but finally he had to seek help. He was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer and given a few weeks to live.
In those final days old Special Forces and Ranger friends slipped past “No Visitors” signs to see him. When SOG vets Ben Lyons and Martin Bennett and a civilian friend, Chuck Hendricks, visited him, Howard climbed from his bed to model the uniform jacket he would be buried in, festooned with the Medal of Honor and rows upon rows of ribbons. A proud Master Parachutist and military skydiver, he showed them the polished jump boots he’d been working on, and asked Bennett to touch up the spit shine. Though his feet might not be visible in his coffin, he wanted that shine just right.
As they left, Col. Howard thanked Bennett, and then saluted him and held his hand crisply to his eyebrow until Bennett returned it. Bob Howard passed away two days before Christmas.
This great hero, a humble knight who was a paragon for all, belongs to history now. He is survived by his daughters Denicia, Melissa and Rosslyn; an Airborne-Ranger son, Robert Jr., and four grandchildren.
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U.S.—In a rash of tragedies all across the United States, every single bump stock in the nation was tragically lost in various boating accidents earlier this week.
Coincidentally, the bump stocks have just been banned by the Trump administration. Since all the bump stocks have been destroyed, it’s now impossible for the ATF to confiscate them or fine people who did not destroy them.
“Well, I guess our job is done,” an ATF representative said. “We were gonna have to make sure people complied with this unilateral executive order, but now I guess we can just harass gun owners for other stuff. Worked out pretty nicely for all of us, I think.”
It’s not clear why gun owners were taking their bump stocks boating. Some have theorized they were using them to fish, or just wanted to make sure they weren’t stolen why they were away. Whatever the case, it’s tragic that the bump stocks are now all at the bottom of lakes, rivers, and oceans from coast to coast.
General H Norman Schwarzkopf passes on…
General Schwarzkopf was the General that was responsible for the success of Desert Storm, We in the storm called him “our General”, From everything that I read, he and the other officers that were the product of Vietnam war, vowed not to repeat the mistakes that hamstrung the American war effort. I remember several of them, He would not do the incremental increase that marked the Vietnam effort. Schwarzkopf wanted to have overpowering force to apply on the Iraqi’s. He wanted an entire armored corp in theater when the Shield became Storm. That is why VII corp was brought in from Europe, and that is how my unit found itself still in BDU’s in a desert war. We in VII corp were very recognizable from the stateside units, they were the desert chocoships and our stuff was Forest green. Another belief was the what we called ” the duration effect” We were told that there would be no rotation of units, we would be there for the duration. There would be no individual soldier rotating out also. You would go to war with your buddy, no FNG’s like Vietnam. There were no ROE restrictions, no Navy/Air force segregated kill box. All the assets were available to the commander for the sole purpose of completing the mission. General Schwarzkopf was responsible for our pride as a military and finally throwing the “Vietnam effect” on our national policy. May the vikings raise their meade glasses as another warrior arrives in Vahalla.
WASHINGTON (AP) — Retired Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who topped an illustrious military career by commanding the U.S.-led international coalition that drove Saddam Hussein‘s forces out of Kuwait in 1991 but kept a low public profile in controversies over the second Gulf War against Iraq, died Thursday. He was 78.
Schwarzkopf died in Tampa, Fla., where he had lived in retirement, according to a U.S. official, who was not authorized to release the information publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.
A much-decorated combat soldier in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was known popularly as “Stormin’ Norman” for a notoriously explosive temper.
He served in his last military assignment in Tampa as commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command, the headquarters responsible for U.S. military and security concerns in nearly 20 countries from the eastern Mediterranean and Africa to Pakistan.
Schwarzkopf became “CINC-Centcom” in 1988 and when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait three years later to punish it for allegedly stealing Iraqi oil reserves, he commanded Operation Desert Storm, the coalition of some 30 countries organized by then-President George H.W. Bush that succeeded in driving the Iraqis out.
At the peak of his postwar national celebrity, Schwarzkopf — a self-proclaimed political independent — rejected suggestions that he run for office, and remained far more private than other generals, although he did serve briefly as a military commentator for NBC.
While focused primarily in his later years on charitable enterprises, he campaigned for President George W. Bush in 2000 but was ambivalent about the 2003 invasion of Iraq, saying he doubted victory would be as easy as the White House and Pentagon predicted. In early 2003 he told the Washington Post the outcome was an unknown:
“What is postwar Iraq going to look like, with the Kurds and the Sunnis and the Shiites? That’s a huge question, to my mind. It really should be part of the overall campaign plan,” he said.
Initially Schwarzkopf had endorsed the invasion, saying he was convinced that former Secretary of State Colin Powell had given the United Nations powerful evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. After that proved false, he said decisions to go to war should depend on what U.N. weapons inspectors found.
He seldom spoke up during the conflict, but in late 2004, he sharply criticized then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon for mistakes that included inadequate training for Army reservists sent to Iraq and for erroneous judgments about Iraq.
“In the final analysis I think we are behind schedule. … I don’t think we counted on it turning into jihad (holy war),” he said in an NBC interview.
Schwarzkopf was born Aug. 24, 1934, in Trenton, N.J., where his father, Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., founder and commander of the New Jersey State Police, was then leading the investigation of the Lindbergh kidnap case, which ended with the arrest and 1936 execution of German-born carpenter Richard Hauptmann for stealing and murdering the famed aviator’s infant son.
The elder Schwarzkopf was named Herbert, but when the son was asked what his “H” stood for, he would reply, “H.” Although reputed to be short-tempered with aides and subordinates, he was a friendly, talkative and even jovial figure who didn’t like “Stormin’ Norman” and preferred to be known as “the Bear,” a sobriquet given him by troops.
He also was outspoken at times, including when he described Gen. William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, as “a horse’s ass” in an Associated Press interview.
As a teenager Norman accompanied his father to Iran, where the elder Schwarzkopf trained the country’s national police force and was an adviser to Reza Pahlavi, the young Shah of Iran.
Young Norman studied there and in Switzerland, Germany and Italy, then followed in his father’s footsteps to West Point, graduating in 1956 with an engineering degree. After stints in the U.S. and abroad, he earned a master’s degree in engineering at the University of Southern California and later taught missile engineering at West Point.
In 1966 he volunteered for Vietnam and served two tours, first as a U.S. adviser to South Vietnamese paratroops and later as a battalion commander in the U.S. Army’s Americal Division. He earned three Silver Stars for valor — including one for saving troops from a minefield — plus a Bronze Star, a Purple Heart and three Distinguished Service Medals.
While many career officers left military service embittered by Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was among those who opted to stay and help rebuild the tattered Army into a potent, modernized all-volunteer force.
After Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Schwarzkopf played a key diplomatic role by helping to persuade Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd to allow U.S. and other foreign troops to deploy on Saudi territory as a staging area for the war to come.
On Jan. 17, 1991, a five-month buildup called Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm as allied aircraft attacked Iraqi bases and Baghdad government facilities. The six-week aerial campaign climaxed with a massive ground offensive on Feb. 24-28, routing the Iraqis from Kuwait in 100 hours before U.S. officials called a halt.
Schwarzkopf said afterward he agreed with Bush’s decision to stop the war rather than drive to Baghdad to capture Saddam, as his mission had been only to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait.
But in a desert tent meeting with vanquished Iraqi generals, he allowed a key concession on Iraq’s use of helicopters, which later backfired by enabling Saddam to crack down more easily on rebellious Shiites and Kurds.
While he later avoided the public second-guessing by academics and think tank experts over the ambiguous outcome of Gulf War I and its impact on Gulf War II, he told the Washington Post in 2003, “You can’t help but… with 20/20 hindsight, go back and say, ‘Look, had we done something different, we probably wouldn’t be facing what we are facing today.'”
After retiring from the Army in 1992, Schwarzkopf wrote a best-selling autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take A Hero.” Of his Gulf war role, he said, “I like to say I’m not a hero. I was lucky enough to lead a very successful war.” He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II and honored with decorations from France, Britain, Belgium, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.
Schwarzkopf was a national spokesman for prostate cancer awareness and for Recovery of the Grizzly Bear, served on the Nature Conservancy board of governors and was active in various charities for chronically ill children.
“I may have made my reputation as a general in the Army and I’m very proud of that,” he once told the AP. “But I’ve always felt that I was more than one-dimensional. I’d like to think I’m a caring human being. … It’s nice to feel that you have a purpose.”
Schwarzkopf and his wife, Brenda, had three children: Cynthia, Jessica and Christian.
Maynard Harrison SmithFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Maynard Harrison Smith
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Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson awarding the Medal of Honor to S/Sgt. Smith
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| Nickname(s) | Snuffy Smith |
| Born | May 19, 1911 Caro, Michigan |
| Died | May 11, 1984 (aged 72) Saint Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida, USA |
| Place of burial |
Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington County, Virginia, USA
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| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/ |
 United States Army Air Forces |
| Years of service | 1942–1945 |
| Rank |  Staff Sergeant |
| Unit | 423d Bombardment Squadron |
| Battles/wars | World War II |
| Awards |  Medal of Honor Air Medal (2) |
Maynard Harrison “Snuffy” Smith (May 19, 1911 – May 11, 1984) was a United States Army Air Forces Staff Sergeant and aerial gunner aboard a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber in World War II, received the Medal of Honor for his conduct during a bombing mission over France on May 1, 1943.[1][2]
Contents
Enlistment[edit]
Maynard H. Smith enlisted in the US Army Air Forces in 1942. After completing basic training he volunteered for aerial gunnery school. At the time all aerial gunners were non-commissioned officers and the move to the school was a quick way for the private to gain rank and pay.[2][3]
After completing the aerial gunnery school, he was shipped overseas to Thurleigh, Bedfordshire, in south-central England, where he joined the 423rd Bombardment Squadron, 306th Bomb Group. Staff Sergeant Smith quickly gained a reputation as a stubborn and obnoxious airman who did not get along well with the other airmen stationed there, hence his nickname “Snuffy Smith”, possibly from the popular comic strip of the era, Barney Google and Snuffy Smith. Consequently, it was six weeks before he was assigned his first combat mission.[2][3]
Medal of Honor action[edit]
It was during his first mission, on May 1, 1943 that Staff Sergeant Smith, who was assigned to the ball gun turret, helped save the lives of six of his wounded comrades, put out a blazing fire, and drove off wave after wave of German fighters.
The target of the mission was the U-Boat pens at Saint-Nazaire in Loire-Atlantique, France, on the Bay of Biscay. Saint Nazaire was heavily defended by antiaircraft guns and was nicknamed “flak city” by the airmen.[4]
Staff Sergeant Maynard Smith of the 306th Bombardment Group, is presented with the Medal of Honor by Secretary of War Henry L Stimson in front of a B-17 Flying Fortress at Thurleigh Airfield, USAAF Station 111, England.
Several of the bombers failed to rendezvous as intended, and others had mechanical problems and had to turn back. The middle portion of the bombing mission went well, with no German fighters engaging the mission until after they had released their bomb loads. The bombers managed to drop their payload on target with little resistance from the Germans in occupied France. As the fighters came up, the bombing group managed to elude them by flying into a large cloud bank.[4]
Due to a navigational error, after being in the cloud bank, the navigator in the lead plane believed he was approaching the southern coast of Britain. In fact, the aircraft were approaching the heavily fortified German-occupied city of Brest, France and the southern coast of the Breton Peninsula. The pilot began to descend to 2,000 feet and was almost immediately overtaken by several German fighters and intense anti-aircraft fire.[5]
Staff Sergeant Smith’s bomber was hit, rupturing the fuel tanks and igniting a massive fire in the center of the fuselage. The damage to the aircraft was severe, knocking out communications and compromising the fuselage’s integrity. Smith’s ball turret lost power and he scrambled out to assist the other crew members. Three crew members bailed out, while Smith tended to two others who were seriously wounded.
Smith manning a machine gun
In between helping his wounded comrades, Smith also manned the .50 caliber machine guns and fought the raging fire. The heat from the fire was so intense that it had begun to melt the metal in the fuselage, threatening to break the plane in half.
For nearly 90 minutes, Smith alternated between shooting at the attacking fighters, tending to his wounded crew members and fighting the fire. To starve the fire of fuel, he threw burning debris and exploding ammunition through the large holes that the fire had melted in the fuselage. After the fire extinguishers were exhausted, Smith finally managed to put the fire out, in part by urinating on it.
Staff Sergeant Smith’s bomber reached England and landed at the first available airfield, where it broke in half as it touched down. Smith’s bomber had been hit with more than 3,500 bullets and pieces of shrapnel.
The three crew members who bailed out were never recovered and presumed lost at sea, but Smith’s efforts on that day undoubtedly saved the lives of six others aboard his aircraft.[3]
Journalist Andy Rooney, at the time a reporter for Stars and Stripes, was at the base where Smith’s plane landed and wrote a front-page story about it. While reflecting on Smith’s award years later on 60 Minutes, Rooney indicated “I was proud of my part in that.”[6]
Smith was assigned to KP duty the week that he was awarded the Medal of Honor as punishment for arriving late to a briefing. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson placed the medal around Smith’s neck during a formation.
Marines of the US 1st Marine Division watch F4U Corsairs drop napalm on Chinese positions near the Chosin Reservoir; December 26th, 1950.
Battle of Chosin Reservoir
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Coordinates: 40°29′N 127°12′E
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as the Chosin Reservoir Campaign or the Changjin Lake Campaign (Korean: 장진호 전투; hanja: 長津湖戰鬪; rr: Jangjin ho jeontu; Chinese: 长津湖战役; pinyin: Cháng Jīn Hú Zhànyì),[c] was a decisive battle in the Korean War. The name “Chosin” is derived from the Japanese pronunciation “Chōshin“, instead of Korean pronunciation “Changjin“, of the Chinese word 長津.[12][13] The UN forces relied on Japanese language maps dating from their occupation of Korea which had ended only five years earlier at the conclusion of World War II. Shortly after the People’s Republic of China entered the conflict, the People’s Volunteer Army 9th Army[d] infiltrated the northeastern part of North Korea. |
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On 27 November 1950, the Chinese 9th Army surprised the US X Corps commanded by Major General Edward Almond at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal 17-day battle in freezing weather soon followed.
In the period between 27 November and 13 December, 30,000[4] United Nations troops (later nicknamed “The Chosin Few”) under the field command of Major General Oliver P. Smith were encircled and attacked by approximately 120,000[6] Chinese troops under the command of Song Shi-Lun, who had been ordered by Mao Zedong to destroy the UN forces.
The UN forces were nonetheless able to make a fighting withdrawal and broke out of the encirclement while inflicting crippling losses on the Chinese.
The evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam marked the complete withdrawal of UN troops from North Korea.
While the Marines succeeded in withdrawing it was mainly due to Task Force Faith to their east who took on the full brunt of the Chinese offensive.
Without Task Force Faith taking heavy casualties and becoming prisoners of war the Marines in the west would have more than likely been encircled. The Chinese succeeded in pushing the UN forces out of northeastern North Korea but suffered heavy casualties.
Contents
Background
Map of UN advances toward the Yalu River.
By mid-1950 after the successful landing at Inchon by the US X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People’s Army.
The Korean War appeared to be all but over.[14] United Nations (UN) forces advanced rapidly into North Korea with the intention of reuniting North and South Korea before the end of 1950.[15]
North Korea is divided through the center by the impassable Taebaek Mountains, which separated the UN forces into two groups.[16]
The US Eighth Army advanced north through the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps and the US X Corps advanced north on the eastern coast.[16]
At the same time the People’s Republic of China entered the conflict after issuing several warnings to the United Nations.[17] On 19 October 1950, large formations of Chinese troops, dubbed the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA), secretly crossed the border and into North Korea.[18]
One of the first Chinese units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN advances.[19]
On 25 October, the advancing ROK I Corps made contact with the Chinese and halted at Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir.[20]
After the landing at Wonsan, the US 1st Marine Division of the X Corps engaged the defending PVA 124th Division on 2 November, and the ensuing battle caused heavy casualties among the Chinese.[21]
On 6 November, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a retreat to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces into the Chosin Reservoir.[22]
By 24 November, the 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni[e] on the eastern side of the reservoir, and Yudami-ni on the west side of the reservoir.[23]
Faced with the sudden attacks by Chinese forces in the Eighth Army sector, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army to launch the Home-by-Christmas Offensive.[24]
To support the offensive, MacArthur ordered the X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir and to cut the vital Manpojin—Kanggye—Huichon supply line.[25][26] As a response, Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of the US X Corps, formulated a plan on 21 November.
It called for the US 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the US 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni.
The US 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing security in the rear area.[27] By then the X Corps was stretched thin along a 400-mile front.[23]
Surprised by the Marine landing at Wonsan,[28] China’s Chairman Mao Zedong called for the immediate destruction of the ROK Capital Division, ROK 3rd Infantry Division, US 1st Marine Division, and US 7th Infantry Division in a telegraph to Commander[f] Song Shi-Lun of the PVA 9th Army on 31 October.[29]
Under Mao’s urgent orders, the 9th Corps Army was rushed into North Korea on 10 November.[30] Undetected by UN intelligence,[31] the 9th Corps Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on 17 November, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.[22]
Prelude
Location, terrain and weather
Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula.[32] The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.[33]
The battle’s main focus was around the 78 miles (126 km) long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir,[34] which served as the only retreat route for the UN forces.[35]
Through these roads, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni,[e] located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri.
From there, the road passes through Koto-ri and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam.[36] The area around the Chosin Reservoir was sparsely populated.[37]
The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War.[4]
The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass, overlook the entire length of the road. The road’s quality was poor, and in some places it was reduced to a one lane gravel trail.[36]
On 14 November 1950, a cold front from Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged to as low as −35 °F (−37 °C).[38]
The cold weather was accompanied by frozen ground, creating considerable danger of frostbite casualties, icy roads, and weapon malfunctions.
Medical supplies froze; morphine syrettes had to be defrosted in a medic’s mouth before they could be injected; frozen blood plasma was useless on the battlefield.
Even cutting off clothing to deal with a wound risked gangrene and frostbite. Batteries used for the Jeeps and radios did not function properly in the temperature and quickly ran down.[39]
The lubrication in the guns gelled and rendered them useless in battle. Likewise, the springs on the firing pins would not strike hard enough to fire the round, or would jam.[40]
Forces and strategies
Map of the Battle of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.[e]
Major General Edward Almond (seated), commander of the US X Corps, and Major General Oliver P. Smith, commander of the US 1st Marine Division.
Although the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan as part of Almond’s US X Corps, Almond and Major General Oliver P. Smithof the 1st Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other that dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchon.
When Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even though he had never been involved in one. Smith believed there were large numbers of Chinese forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher headquarters in Tokyo said otherwise.
But Almond felt Smith was overly cautious. The mutual distrust between the commanders caused Smith to slow the 1st Marine Division’s advance towards the Chosin Reservoir in violation of Almond’s instructions. Smith established supply points and airfields along the way at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.[45]
As the US X Corps was pushing towards the reservoir, the Chinese formulated their strategy, based on their experiences in the Chinese Civil War.
Working from the assumption that only a light UN presence would be at the reservoir, the Chinese 9th Corps Army was first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri.
Believing the bulk of the US X Corps would move to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Army would then block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam.
The 9th Army initially committed eight[47]divisions for the battle,[48] with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.[46]
The flaw in the Chinese plan was a lack of accurate intelligence about the UN forces.[49] Even though the US X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the slow Marine advance allowed the bulk of the US 1st Marine Division, including the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines, to be concentrated at Yudami-ni.[50][51]
Furthermore, the strategically important Hagaru-ri, which contained an airfield and a supply dump,[52] was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the 1stand the 7th Marines.[53]
Only the Regimental Combat Team 31, an understrength and hastily formed regimental combat team of the US 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank of the reservoir.[54]
Those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese assaults. As for the UN forces, the 1st Marine Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the battle,[55] and it was further reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marine Commando. and the equivalent of two regiments from the 3rd and the 7th Army Infantry Divisions.[4]
The UN forces had a combined strength of about 30,000 men during the course of the battle.[4] The UN forces at Chosin were also supported by one of the greatest concentrations of air power during the Korean War,[56] since the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing stationed at Yonpo Airfield and five aircraft carriers from the US Navy Task Force 77 were able to launch 230 sorties daily to provide close air supportduring the battle,[56] while the US Air Force Far East Combat Cargo Command in Japan reached the capacity of airdropping 250 tons of supplies per day to resupply the trapped UN forces.[57]
Although the 9th Corps Army was one of China’s elite formations, composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign,[46] several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle.
Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November, but Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea before that could happen.[58]
As the result, the 9th Corps Army had almost no winter clothing for the harsh Korean winter.[59] Similarly, poor logistics forced the 9th Corps Army to abandon heavy artillery,[5][60] while working with little food and ammunition.[59]
The food shortage forced the 9th Corps Army to initially station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir as reserve,[61] and starvation and exposure broke out among the Chinese units since foraging was not an option at the sparsely populated reservoir.[59]
By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops had died from the cold than from combat and air raids.[62]
The Chinese strength is usually estimated at 120,000[6] troops for the battle,[63] since the 9th Army was composed of 12 divisions with a strength of 10,000+ men per division.[64][not in citation given]
Before arriving in Korea, the 9th Corps Army was also reinforced. Each of its three Corps now had four divisions instead of the regular three.
Infantry from two formerly liberated (surrendered) Nationalist divisions were absorbed[65] to bring each infantry company up to strength. Some companies had ~150 men,[66] but some companies were reinforced with more than 200 men.[67]
On average, each division of the 9th Army had more infantry troops than other Chinese divisions.
Eventually all 12 Chinese divisions of the 9th Corps Army were deployed. Eight divisions of the PVA 20th and 27th Corps served as the main attacking force.[47]
Four divisions of the PVA 26th Corps initially were held back in reserve, and deployed after 20th and 27th Corps exhausted all available strength.[68]
Battle
Song Shilun (middle), commander of the PVA 9th Army at Chosin Reservoir.
On the night of 27 November, the PVA 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Corps Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri.
At Yudam-ni, the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines were surrounded and attacked by the PVA 79th and 89th Divisions, with the 59th Division attacking the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri to cut off communication.
Similarly, RCT-31 was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th, 81st and 94th Divisions. At Hagaru-ri, the 1st Marine Division command headquarters was attacked by the PVA 58th Division. Finally, the PVA 60th Division surrounded elements of the 1st Marines at Koto-ri from the north.[46] Caught by complete surprise, the UN forces were cut off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by 28 November.[69]
Actions at Yudam-ni
Soldiers from the Chinese 79th Division moving to engage the Marines at Yudam-ni.
Acting on Almond’s instruction, Smith ordered the 5th Marines to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on 27 November.[70]
The attack was soon stalled by the PVA 89th Division and forced the Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni.[71][72]
As night came, three Chinese regiments of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and north west of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke.[73]
Close range fighting soon developed as the attackers infiltrated Marine positions,[74] but the 5th and 7th Marines held the line while inflicting heavy casualties to the Chinese.[75] As day broke on 28 November, the Chinese forces and the American defenders were locked in a stalemate around the Yudam-ni perimeter.[77]
While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending Charlie and Fox Companies of the 7th Marines.[78] The successful assault forced Charlie Company to retreat into Yudam-ni which left Fox Company trapped in Toktong Pass, a vital pass that controlled the road.[79] On 29 November, several efforts by the 7th Marines failed to rescue Fox Company despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese.[80] Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and Marine Corsair fighters, Fox Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.[81]
After the heavy losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, 9th Corps Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the 1st Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that was double the initial estimate.[82]Believing that any further assaults would be futile, Song Shi-Lun ordered the 9th Army to switch their main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri,[82] leaving Yudam-ni alone from 28 November to 30 November.[83] At the same time, the US Eighth Army on the Korean western front was forced into full retreat at the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River, and MacArthur ordered Almond to withdraw the US X Corps to the port of Hungnam.[84] Acting on the instruction of Almond and Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanders of the 5th and 7th Marines, respectively, issued a joint order to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on 30 November.[85] Faced with tough fighting between the blocking Chinese divisions and the withdrawing Marines, Smith remarked: “Retreat, hell! We’re not retreating, we’re just advancing in a different direction.”[86]
For the breakout, the Marines formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) would attack towards Fox Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass.[87] To start the breakout, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) had to first attack south and capture Hill 1542 and Hill 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks.[88] The breakout was carried out under the air cover of the 1st Marine Air Wing.[89]
Marines engaging the Chinese.
On the morning of 1 December, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hill 1542 and Hill 1419. The tenacious Chinese defenders soon forced the Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks[90] when the convoy passed 3/7’s position by the afternoon.[88] With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni while the 89th Division rushed south towards Koto-ri.[91] The Chinese struck at night, and the ferocious fighting forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks.[92] The fighting lasted well into the morning of 2 December until all the Marines managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.[92]
At the same time, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on 1 December. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield.[93] As night approached, 1/7 finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road.[94] Relying on the element of surprise, they managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road.[95] On the morning of 2 December, a joint attack by Fox Company and 1/7 secured the Toktong Pass, thus opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.[96]
Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still had to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties upon 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5).[97] Although strong air cover suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and road blocks slowed the retreat to a crawl while inflicting numerous casualties.[98] Despite those difficulties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of 3 December, with the withdrawal completed on 4 December.[99]
East of the reservoir[edit]
Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, Jr. RCT-31 was later known as “Task Force Faith” due to his leadership.
Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT-31), later known as “Task Force Faith”, was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of Sinhung-ni.[100] Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment,[82] the task force was actually under strength with one battalionmissing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.[100]
On the night of 27 November, three regiments from the 80th Division attacked the northern hills and the inlets,[101] completely surprising the defenders.[102] The ensuing battle inflicted heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry to the north of Sinhung-ni,[103] while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry were almost overrun at the inlet.[104] The Chinese also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221,[105] an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni.[106]As the night’s fighting ended, RCT-31 was separated into three elements.[107]
Believing that the defenders were completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceeded to loot the US positions for food and clothing.[108] As the morning came on 28 November, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the surprised Chinese back in a complete rout.[108][109] In the afternoon, Almond flew into the perimeter of RCT-31, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack north and deal with whatever “remnants” of Chinese forces that were in their way. Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Starsto three of Maclean’s officers. In disgust, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., the commander of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, threw his medal into the snow.[110]
Chinese troops assaulting Task Force Faith’s position at Sinhung-ni.
On the night of 28 November, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with four regiments.[111] At the inlet, the Chinese assault became a disaster as communications broke down while devastating fire from the anti-aircraft (AA) guns attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion swept the Chinese ranks.[112][113][g] In the aftermath of the fighting, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had less than 600 soldiers.[114] The attacks by PVA 240th Regiment, on the other hand, forced Maclean to order a retreat from the northern hills towards the inlet.[115] On 29 November, the 1st Battalion managed to break through the Chinese blockade and reached the inlet, but Maclean disappeared as he mistook some Chinese soldiers as American.[116][h] The Chinese finally stopped their attacks on the night of 29 November while waiting for fresh reinforcements.[117]
While RCT-31 was under siege, Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni—an impossible order for Smith to implement.[118] Only the 31st Tank Company tried to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221,[119] but without infantry support, the two armored attacks on 28 and 29 November were stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults.[120] By 30 November the US forces evacuated Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.[121]
On 30 November, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into the Sinhung-ni inlet and met with Faith, who by now had assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to carry.[122] On the same day, parts of the PVA 94th Division[i] and the rest of 81st Division[123]arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division.[117] By midnight, six[124] Chinese regiments renewed their attacks and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn.[125] Again, the 57th Battalion’s AA guns held the Chinese at bay,[126] but the shell supplies were running desperately low.[127] On the day of 1 December, Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.[127]
Marines watch F4U Corsairs drop napalm on Chinese positions.
The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide air cover on 1 December.[128] As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces,[129] with three other regiments closing in.[130] Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and US troops.[131] The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company,[130] allowing the convoy to advance.[132] As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks.[132] Chinese fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide.[133] Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon.[134] Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column.[135] As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by a Chinese grenade and subsequently died of his wounds.[136] The convoy managed to fight past the first road block, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks.[137] About 1,050 soldiers out of the original 2,500 managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and only 385 survivors were deemed able-bodied.[138] The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.[139]
Actions at Hagaru-ri[edit]
A Direct Air Support Center at Hagaru-ri.
To support the Marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. Smith and 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri.[69] With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marines, the rest of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from both the Army and the Marine Corps.[140]
The original Chinese plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of 27 November, but the division became lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps it used.[141] It was not until the dawn of 28 November that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri.[141] Meanwhile, from the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri noticed the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1), predicted the Chinese attack would come on the night of 28 November.[142] Almost everyone, including rear support units with little combat training, was pressed into the front line due to the manpower shortage,[143] and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.[144]
It was not long before the PVA 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter, while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on the northern perimeter.[145] Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was overwhelmed, with the Chinese opening several gaps in the defenses and reaching the rear areas.[146] The resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the Chinese soldiers, who began looting food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation.[147] The defending Americans managed to destroy the Chinese forces in counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close.[143] When the fighting stopped, the Chinese had only gained the East Hill on the northern perimeter.[143] Another attack was planned for the night of 29 November, but air raids by VMF-542 broke up the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.[148]
Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, on November 29, Smith ordered Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller of the First Marine Regiment to assemble a task force to be sent north from Koto-ri to open the road south of Hagaru-ri.[149][150] In response, a task force was formed with 921 troops from the 41 Royal Marine Commando, G Company of the 1st Marines and B Company of the 31st Infantry.[151][152] The task force was dubbed “Task Force Drysdale” after its commander Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Commando.[151] On the afternoon of 29 November, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri while under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division.[153][154]The task force’s harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname “Hell Fire Valley”.[155] As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized,[156] and a destroyed truck in the convoy later split the task force into two segments.[157] Although the lead segment of the task force fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of 29 November, the rear segment was destroyed.[158]Despite suffering 159 wounded and 162 dead and missing, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defense at Hagaru-ri.[152][159]
As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni on 30 November,[160] the garrisons attempted to recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed despite the destruction of a Chinese company.[161][162] When darkness settled, the PVA 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last-ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri.[163] The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill giving way.[164] As the Chinese tried to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.[165]
By 1 December, the PVA 58th Division was virtually destroyed,[166] with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army.[167][168] But much to the frustration of Song Shi-Lun, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the Marines broke out of Yudam-ni.[9] The airfield was opened to traffic on 1 December, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and the wounded.[169] With the Marines at Yudam-ni completing their withdrawal on 4 December, the trapped UN forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.
Breakout[edit]
Map of the Retreat from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.
After a short period of rest, the breakout began on 6 December with the 7th Marines as the vanguard of the retreating column while the 5th Marines covered the rear.[170] At the same time, the much-delayed PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Division relieving the 58th and 60th Divisions.[171]As the 7th Marines pushed aside the PVA 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marines took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th Division.[172][173] In a last effort to stop the breakout,[172] the customary Chinese night attack returned with the 76th and 77th Division striking the Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions.[167] The Marines repulsed the Chinese attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.[174]
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high ground surrounding the road. But as soon as the Marines pulled out, the 77th Division returned to the peaks and attacked the column.[175][176] Chaotic fighting broke out within the column and the retreat was slowed to a crawl.[177] The Marine night fighters, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces,[176] and the fighting destroyed most of the blocking troops.[178]On 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Koto-ri with little difficulty with the last elements arrived at Koto-ri that night.[179]
After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and the 27th Corps to chase the escaping UN force with the 20th Corps blocking the escape route.[178][180] But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Koto-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and the 60th Divisions.[181] In desperation, Song Shi-Lun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass while blowing up the vital treadway bridge, hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and the 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.[9][181] The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 blew up the original concrete bridge and two improvised replacements in succession, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable.[182][183] In response, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on 9 December after the defenders fought to the last man.[184] At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the treadway bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders that were already frozen in their foxholes.[185]
A patrol from US 3rd Infantry Division’s Task Force Dog moves into Funchilin Pass on 9 December.
With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass, eight C-119 Flying Boxcarsflown by the US 314th Troop Carrier Wing were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute.[186][187] The bridge, consisting of eight separate 18 ft (5.5 m) long, 2,900 lb (1,300 kg) sections, was dropped one section at a time, using a 48 ft (15 m) parachute on each section.[188] Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the US Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on 9 December, enabling UN forces to proceed.[189] Outmaneuvered, the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions combined had only 200 soldiers left.[190] The last UN forces left Funchilin Pass by 11 December.[191]
One of the last engagements during the withdrawal was an ambush at Sudong by the pursuing PVA 89th Division,[190]which Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty.[192] The trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on 11 December.[193]
Evacuation at Hungnam[edit]
The U.S. Navy high-speed transportUSS Begor (APD-127) observes the destruction of Hungnam’s port facilities on 24 December 1950.
_off_Hungnam_December_1950.jpg)
The U.S. Navy heavy cruiserUSS Saint Paul (CA-73) fires her 8-inch (203-mm) guns at Chinese troops threatening the evacuation from Hungnam in December 1950.
By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, MacArthur had already ordered the evacuation of the US X Corps on 8 December in order to reinforce the US Eighth Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel.[194][195] Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment, the US 3rd Infantry Division and the US 7th Infantry Division had also set up defensive positions around the port.[196]Some skirmishes broke out between the defending US 7th, 17th and 65th Infantryand the pursuing PVA 27th Corps,[197] but against the strong naval gun fire support provided by US Navy Task Force 90, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.[195][198]
In what US historians called the “greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history”,[199] a 193-ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean refugees.[200] One Victory ship, the SS Meredith Victory evacuated 14,000 refugees. The last UN unit left at 14:36 on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Chinese and North Korean forces.[199] The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.[201]
Aftermath[edit]
…Casualties had reached a 40,000 high. The Central [Government] expresses its deepest sorrow…
While the US X Corps was being evacuated from the eastern front, the US Eighth Army had already retreated to the 38th parallel on the western front in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River. With the entire UN front collapsing, the race to the Yalu was ended with the communist forces of China recapturing much of North Korea.[14] The Korean War would drag on for another two and a half years before the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.[14] Besides the loss of North Korea, the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps later reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties, of which 4,385 were from the US Marines, 3,163 were from the US Army, 2,812 were from South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 were from the British Royal Marines.[203] Outside of the combat losses, the 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather.[204]
Despite the losses, the US X Corps preserved much of its strength.[205] About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan,[200] and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. Commanding General Smith was credited for saving the US X Corps from destruction,[206] while the 1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal Marines Commando and the Army’s RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their tenacity during the battle.[207][208][209] Fourteen Marines, two Soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname “The Chosin Few”.[207][210] On 15 September 2010, the Veterans of the Korean War Chosin Reservoir Battle memorial was unveiled by the United States Marine Corps Commandant General James T. Conway at Camp Pendleton.[211]
China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following the victory at Chosin,[212] but the victory came with a staggering cost. With the escape of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps, Mao’s vision for Chosin was not realized, and the failure caused Song Shi-Lun to offer his resignation.[213] At the same time, heavy casualties caused by both combat and poor logistical support destroyed much of the eight elite divisions under the 20th and the 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two divisions were forced to disband,[214] and not until March 1951 did the 9th Army return to its normal strength and become combat effective.[2][215] With the absence of nearly 40 percent of the Chinese forces in Korea in early 1951, the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin ultimately enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.[2]
Operation Glory[edit]
During the battle, UN casualties were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. Operation Glory took place from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US Soldiers and Marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.[216] After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War “unknowns” were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (the “Punchbowl Cemetery” in Honolulu, Hawaii). According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted during “Operation Glory” from the Chinese and North Koreans, of which 858 proved to be correct.[217] The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns.[k] From 1990 to 1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains which possibly include 200 to 400 US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.[218] From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the Chinese border between 1996 and 2006.
There is a long-standing adage in combat arms branches that says “you haven’t had a full career until you’ve gotten an Article 15.”
Well, this Vietnam War veteran had his share non-judicial punishments (authorized by Article 15 of UCMJ), racked up 115 confirmed kills and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. He was also one of the most decorated soldier in American international combat, even eclipsing both Alvin York and Audie Murphy.
Born in the summer of 1938 in South Carolina, Joe Ronnie Hooper was relocated as a child to Moses Lake, Washington.
Originally a Navy man, Hooper first enlisted in December of 1956. He worked in naval aviation, eventually reaching the rank of Petty Officer 3rd class, the equivalent of an Army or Marine corporal (E-4). He was honorably discharged in 1959.
The next year, Hooper enlisted in the US Army as a Private First Class. After graduating Basic Training, he volunteered for Airborne School. From there he did tours of duty in Fort Bragg, Korea and Fort Hood, eventually making his way to Fort Campbell’s 101st Airborne Division.
Now a Staff Sergeant, Hooper requested a tour in Vietnam but was sent to Panama instead as a platoon sergeant. Unable to stay out of trouble while he was there, he was the subject of several Article 15 hearings and was eventually demoted to Corporal.
However, he eventually got his Sergeant back and deployed with the 101st to Vietnam in December of 1967, taking on the role of a squad leader.
On February 21st, 1968, Hooper and his company were beginning an assault on an enemy position when they came under fire by everything from machine guns to rockets.
According to his Medal of Honor citation, Hooper’s unit “was assaulting a heavily defended enemy position along a river bank when it encountered a withering hail of fire from rockets, machine guns and automatic weapons.
Staff Sergeant Hooper rallied several men and stormed across the river, overrunning several bunkers on the opposite shore.
Thus inspired, the rest of the company moved to the attack. With utter disregard for his own safety, he moved out under the intense fire again and pulled back the wounded, moving them to safety.
During this act Hooper was seriously wounded, but he refused medical aid and returned to his men. With the relentless enemy fire disrupting the attack, he single-handedly stormed 3 enemy bunkers, destroying them with hand grenade and rifle fire, and shot 2 enemy soldiers who had attacked and wounded the Chaplain.
Leading his men forward in a sweep of the area, Hooper destroyed three buildings housing enemy riflemen. At this point he was attacked by a North Vietnamese officer whom he fatally wounded with his bayonet.
Finding his men under heavy fire from a house to the front, he proceeded alone to the building, killing its occupants with rifle fire and grenades. By now his initial body wound had been compounded by grenade fragments, yet despite the multiple wounds and loss of blood, he continued to lead his men against the intense enemy fire.
As his squad reached the final line of enemy resistance, it received devastating fire from four bunkers in line on its left flank. Hooper gathered several hand grenades and raced down a small trench which ran the length of the bunker line, tossing grenades into each bunker as he passed by, killing all but two of the occupants.
With these positions destroyed, he concentrated on the last bunkers facing his men, destroying the first with an incendiary grenade and neutralizing two more by rifle fire. He then raced across an open field, still under enemy fire, to rescue a wounded man who was trapped in a trench.
Upon reaching the man, he was faced by an armed enemy soldier whom he killed with a pistol. Moving his comrade to safety and returning to his men, he neutralized the final pocket of enemy resistance by fatally wounding three North Vietnamese officers with rifle fire.
Hooper then established a final line and reorganized his men, not accepting (medical) treatment until this was accomplished and not consenting to evacuation until the following morning.”
While he was discharged from the Infantry upon his return from Vietnam in 1968, he managed to re-enlist and serve as a Public Affairs specialist until President Richard Nixon awarded him the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1969.
Hooper eventually managed to finagle his way back into the Infantry, serving a second tour in Vietnam as a pathfinder with the 101st Airborne.
By 1970, he had been commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant, though he was discharged from an active commission shortly after due to inadequate educational requirements.
Discharged and a little sour about it, Hooper managed to retain his commission in the Army Reserve’s 12th Special Forces Group before being transferred to a training unit.
Though he was eventually promoted to Captain, he was discharged a final time in 1978 after a spotty drill record.
Much like the war he fought in, Hooper is not as well known as other Medal of Honor recipients of his stature. According to accounts, he was a likeable guy who partied hard, drank a lot and related to veterans.
However, he was allegedly rather troubled by America’s treatment of soldiers and attitudes towards the war in general.
He was found dead in a hotel room in Kentucky on May 5, 1979, having suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in his sleep. He was 40 years old.
In addition to the Medal of Honor, Hooper was also awarded two Silver Stars, 6 Bronze Stars with “V” Devices, an Air Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm and 8 Purple Hearts.