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I recently did a post regarding the competing forces for Operation Seelöwe (Sea Lion), the proposed German invasion of Britain in 1940. This post generated a lot of comments in which readers overwhelmingly made two points. The first was that the invasion would have failed had the Germans attempted it. The second was that the Germans were never really serious about Seelöwe in the first place. Given these responses, I thought I would add my perspective on the matter.
In terms of the potential success of Seelöwe, I agree that it almost certainly would have failed. Of course, I am now entering the realm of speculation where there is a wide range of potential outcomes based upon a variety of variables. No one can say for certain what would have happened, but I think the overwhelming odds are that the invasion would have miscarried with the only real question being how bad the competing casualties were. The primary reason for this is that Germany simply lacked the sealift capacity to carry out the invasion and its all-important logistical follow-up. When you consider the massive armada that the Allies used to carry out the Normandy invasion (which took years to assemble and included thousands of specialised landing and support craft) the notion of launching an invasion using towed barges across the English Channel seems ludicrous. Of course, a related factor was the naval imbalance that existed between the Royal Navy and the German Kriegsmarine. Not only did the Germans lack the naval assets to carry out Seelöwe, but they lacked the warship strength to defend it against the massive Royal Navy response that surely would have occurred.
To compensate for this, the Germans proposed to use air power as a means to neutralise Britain’s massive naval advantage, but it is unlikely that this would have been decisive. The Luftwaffe was unable to stop the Dunkirk evacuation or the running of British convoys through the English Channel during the Battle of Britain, so it is equally unlikely it could have stopped the inevitable British counterattacks that would have occurred.
There certainly would have been losses, but enough British warships would have gotten through to cause mayhem. Even with complete air superiority, the Germans could not entirely hold back the Royal Navy. Of course, the Germans did not attain air superiority, and they never really had the capacity to destroy the RAF.
Had the situation become bad enough to compel the RAF to abandon its forward airfields in southern England, all it had to do was pull its forces back into the interior of the country beyond the range of the German Bf 109 fighters. There, the British could husband their strength until the invasion occurred and then re-engage.
A final point is that even if the Germans had managed to get ashore and keep their forces adequately supplied, they would have faced a strong British army that almost certainly would have outnumbered them and would have put up a stout defence. If there is any doubt about the army’s doggedness, all one need do is look at its performance during the fighting in France and Belgium.
At no time during this fighting were the Germans ever able to attain a breakthrough against any of the main British defensive lines. This despite the fact that the Germans carried out multiple attacks using several divisions against these positions.
In most cases, the British only gave ground when events on their flanks or the overall military situation compelled them to do so. Then, when on the move, the British maintained their cohesion and fighting efficiency. A prime example of this was the retreat to Dunkirk during which the army carried out a successful fighting withdrawal despite interference from two German armies and an exposed northern flank. Given this record, it seems likely that the British army would have been a formidable opponent in the defence of its homeland.
Turning now to the second question as to whether the Germans ever really intended to carry out Seelöwe, I think the answer is a qualified no. In my opinion, the proposed undertaking was fundamentally a massive bluff to put pressure on the British to agree to a negotiated settlement.
This is not to say that the entire undertaking was fake, as the Germans did make major preparations to carry it out including the assembly of the ground and naval forces involved. The Germans proceeded as if the invasion was real, and it is possible that it might have been launched had the conditions been right. Sometimes proposed actions can take on a life of their own, and even though the Germans were not keen on carrying out Seelöwe, the momentum of events might have brought it about anyway. When conducting a bluff, fate sometimes compels you to carry it out.
Had the Germans believed they had attained the prerequisite air superiority; they might have attempted the invasion as to do otherwise would have been an affront to their perceived superiority. In this regard, it is reasonable to believe that the Germans were suffering from a strong case of victory disease, and this sense of invincibility might have coloured their decision-making process.
As it was, the Germans did not attain the prerequisite air superiority thus prompting Hitler to cancel Seelöwe. In attaining this outcome, the British managed to do something that seven other European nations had failed to do – maintain their independence in the face of German aggression.
For the Germans, this failure represented the first significant check to their strategic ambitions. It would not be the last. Pictured here are troops of the Seaforth Highlanders on guard duty on chalk clifftops near Dover in the 1940–41 timeframe. Taylor (Lt), War Office official photographer, Public Domain. For more information on this and other related topics, see The Thin Khaki Line, An Operational History of the British and Commonwealth Armies during World War II.
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