This was an unusual incident during the Cold War era; an east bloc shipment of ex-German WWII weapons to a Latin American nation.

(A ship full of problems.)

(Guatemalan army officer with a WWII German le.IG 18 during the 1950s.)

(Militiamen of Guatemala’s Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil march with WWII German 98k rifles during 1996.) (photo by Carlos Sebastián)

Guatemala during WWII

Guatemala was a corporate vassal of the American company United Fruit, ruled by Gen. Jorge Ubico Casteñada. An alleged admirer of the Axis, Ubico none the less declared war on Japan, Germany, and Italy during the second week of December 1941. This made Guatemala eligible for Lend-Lease from the USA, however the small army was ill-equipped for modern warfare and took no meaningful part in WWII.

(Guatemalan AA battery during WWII. This is a M2WC .50cal, the liquid-cooled less-famous brother of the M2HB Browning. The rifle is a 7mm Mauser Mod. 1910 which was still in frontline use.)

Gen. Ubico’s dictatorship did not outlast WWII; on 19 October 1944 he was overthrown by an army coup in favor of elections.

(The USA Lend-Leased six Marmon-Herrington CTMS-1TBI tanks, part of an embargoed Dutch order, to Guatemala. This one was in Guatemala City on the day of the 1944 coup.)

The 1945 election was won by the leftist candidate Juan José Arévalo. During 1951 he was succeeded by Jacobo Árbenz Guzman, who was even more left-of-center. Árbenz had no quarrel with the United States however a cornerstone of his policy was a land redistribution plan which included seizure of some United Fruit real estate. That would be the catalyst for his eventual ouster by the CIA.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s there were already Czechoslovak-made weapons in the Guatemalan army, these having been bought prior to WWII. The army’s main longarm was the vz.24 short rifle.

This bolt-action rifle used the 7x57mm cartridge (2,297fps muzzle velocity) from a 5rds internal magazine. They were marked with the Guatemalan coat of arms. Otherwise the vz.24 was little different than a WWII German 98k.

Guatemala purchased 4,000 of these rifles direct from Brno during 1937. The 7mm cartridge was a very popular caliber in Latin America. These were well-made rifles and Guatemala was impressed with Czechoslovak quality. At the same time Guatemala purchased 1,000 vz.33 carbines from Brno. These were essentially the same as the vz.24s, just a bit shorter and lighter.

Beyond the Czechoslovak guns, the rest of the army was a mixture of woefully obsolete kit (including the old Mauser long rifles and some Remington Rolling Blocks, remarkably still in use during the 1950s) and American WWII Lend-Lease.

(During 1944 the USA provided a half-dozen M3A1 Stuart tanks to supplement and eventually replace Guatemala’s Marmon-Herringtons, which served alongside them past WWII’s end until 1949. Some M8 Greyhound armored cars were also provided. Another four Stuarts were donated after WWII. The Stuarts would serve on into the 1980s and the Greyhounds even longer.)

(First World War Krupp L/13 75mm field guns were still in Guatemalan service in the 1950s. These served alongside a handful of newer American artillery pieces from WWII. This one is today preserved in Guatemala.)

Regarding the Alfhem affair, the wheels which led to that event started turning in 1948. That year Guatemala refused to ratify the 1947 Rio Pact. The reason was that the American-authored treaty called for mutual defense of the western hemisphere. Guatemala claimed British Honduras (today, the nation of Belize) as a “natural part” of its territory and would not commit to defending nations which didn’t recognize their claim (none did).

Strictly speaking that alone did not totally bar Guatemala from American arms. However now, instead of being Rio Pact aid (minimal-cost or free giveaways) Guatemala would have to arrange its own deals, pay full market price, and apply for Office Of Munitions Control export licenses. The US Army would not provide tech support, spare parts, or training assistance. Combined, this had most effects of an arms embargo.

After Guatemala’s 1951 election the U.S. State Department discretely told American defense companies not to bother applying for an export license to Guatemala, which then did make the policy a de facto arms embargo.

arms deals before the Alfhem affair

the Black Eagle of Harlem

(Hubert Julian with an ex-Japanese K5Y “Willow” WWII trainer of the Indonesian air force during 1949. Julian passed away in 1983.)

Hubert Julian was a well-known post-WWII private arms dealer. During 1949 Gen. Harry Vaughan, an aide to President Truman, introduced him to Col. Óscar Morales López, the defense attaché at Guatemala’s embassy. Gen. Vaughan told Julian that since he already held a standing OMC arms export license, it would benefit all involved if he could look after the Guatemalan army’s needs in light of the current political difficulties.

Col. Morales told Julian that the Guatemalan army urgently needed spare parts and tires for its American-made WWII vehicles, which the Pentagon now refused to supply.

(Willys MB jeep of the Guatemalan army two years after WWII.)

Julian found these items in Europe, shipped them on time and in excellent condition to Guatemala, and impressed Col. Morales enough that he hired Julian on retainer. During July 1949 he travelled to Guatemala for the first time.

Upon returning to NYC, Julian met Col. Morales again. He told him “our needs have grown” and gave him quite the list: combat boots, jeeps, machine guns, ammunition, and anti-aircraft weapons. Col. Morales said that Guatemala would pay any fair price named by Julian plus a commission. The first thing he found was the WWII jeeps, from an army-navy surplus store in Ohio. Next, he bought 4,800 pairs of surplus boots from the Arnoff Shoe Company in NYC at $2 / pair, which he resold to Guatemala for $4.20 / pair plus $2.10 commission. The Guatemalans liked them and having no real concept of what combat boots should or shouldn’t cost, were happy to pay that.

In Europe, Julian partnered with the Swiss company Rexim which is explained later below. Via Rexim (which Julian did not disclose as his source to the Guatemalans) he bought two dozen WWII Italian machine guns, 72,000rds of WWII Italian ammo, and one WWII anti-aircraft gun. The Guatemalan army was less than thrilled with the Italian Bredas but considering their political difficulty of obtaining WWII American machine guns, accepted them. During 1952 he bought, again through Rexim, twelve WWII Swiss AA guns. He bought these for $1,500 each ($18,305 in 2026 money) and resold them to Guatemala for $4,000 ($49,250) each.

(WWII Swiss Flab.Kan. 38 anti-aircraft gun. The belt-fed 20mm rounds (3,313fps muzzle velocity) had a range of 1½ miles.)

Hubert Julian was not a perfect arms dealer. He was indiscrete and loved bragging to the media. In a 1952 story picked up by foreign wire services, he told Prensa Libre newspaper that he was finalizing a buy of ex-RAF Spitfire fighters. That was news to the Guatemalan air force, which had instructed Julian to seek P-47 Thunderbolts or P-51 Mustangs from the Americans. In the end Julian was unsuccessful in sourcing any WWII fighters of any type.

As the Swiss AA gun order was shipping in 1952, an agent of the U.S. State Department knocked on the door of Julian’s home in Harlem. He told him that “….it was no longer in the national interest” to keep dealing arms to Guatemala. Julian tended to view laws as a hurdle to overcome, not a hard limit, and continued on.

Julian’s most notable thing with Guatemala was a failed 1953 ammo buy. During WWII a Swiss error resulted in over-production of training-only 20mm ammunition. These rounds had enough energy to cycle a AA gun’s bolt, but greatly reduced range and fragmentation. Externally they looked identical to warshot rounds. The Swiss army was looking to get rid of this ammo. Rexim felt they “had a mark” in Julian, and bought 25,000 rds at pennies for full-price resale to him as new warshot ammo. Only upon military exercises in Guatemala (long after money changed hands) did Julian and the Guatemalans realize they had been ripped off. Julian convinced the Guatemalans that they had been taken advantage of by a European nation (which in abstract, was true). Seeing as he had already provided 250,000+ rds of other badly-needed ammo over the years, Guatemala continued to retain his services.

During the late summer of 1953 Julian had another problem. The Árbenz government knew now it was only a matter of time until the CIA-backed rebels across the border in Nicaragua tried something. The Guatemalan army urgently needed small arms ammunition. He found it in August 1953 from an Italian arms dealer in Naples. Due to political pressure from the USA, it would need to ship non-stop from Italy to Guatemala which is not really a heavily-used commercial route. To hold the ammunition until a ship became available, he put up $40,000 ($490,808 in 2026 money) from his own pocket. The freighter was the Norwegian-flagged S.S. Knut Bakke. In a lapse of care, Julian never personally told S.S. Knut Bakke‘s captain that he should under no circumstances stop along the way. The captain of S.S. Knut Bakke decided to make a brief stop in NYC to see if he could get more paying cargo. U.S. Customs found the ammunition, blatantly marked for Guatemala and with Julian’s name on it, and confiscated it. The federal government seized Julian’s passport.

Unlike the Swiss AA rounds, Guatemala was not out any money here (Julian was out plenty) but at this point, time was as valuable as money. They had lost a quarter of a year and were back at square one trying to source small arms ammunition.

During August 1954 the U.S. government gave Julian his passport back in exchange for a promise (later broken) that he would never again deal arms to “unfavorable governments”. Later that month, he sent a telegram to Castillo Armas, now Guatemala’s president after overthrowing Árbenz, seeking to resume his services. Armas declined, saying that the Americans had suggested other options (not mentioned by name, it was the arms dealer Sam Cummings) and Julian was no longer needed nor wanted in Guatemala.

Rexim

Rexim S.A. was a company in Geneva, Switzerland started during 1947 to do cross-border trade with the American occupation garrison in Germany. It branched out into wholesaling firearms and ammunition. Rexim dealt directly with the Swiss defense ministry, the Swiss gunhouse Oerlikon, the Spanish weapons maker Esperanza y Cia; and had on retainer the arms dealers Maurice Maubert (for Europe) and Hubert Julian (for North America). It cooperated with a Rome-based company called Genar S.R.I. which had a similar setup in Italy. Both shared a finance company in the tax haven of Liechtenstein.

During early 1953, Rexim decided to “cut the middleman” and sell to Guatemala direct. Basically Guatemala did not know that Julian’s prime vendor was Rexim, but Rexim somehow figured out that Julian’s end customer was Guatemala. This became (for obvious reasons) the sole sales route after the 20mm training ammo fiasco. That year Rexim sold the Guatemalan army 25,000 rds of 20mm AA ammunition – ironically to fill the need unmet by the 25,000 useless training rounds, which they themselves had provided Julian, unbeknownst to the Guatemalans.

(WWII Swiss 20mm AA cartridge. This had a mercury fulminate booster which set off the main pentolite charge.)

Rexim was good at slipping things past export customs in Europe. A 1954 2½ tons shipment of “automobile parts” was thought to actually be ammunition, however the ship had already left Europe by the time American intelligence learned of it.

“Good” doesn’t mean perfect. On 15 June 1954, West German police inspected a shipment of consumer goods from the Swiss company Natural de Coultre. It was actually 8 tons of WWII 20mm AA ammunition, with a destination of the Hamburg Freihafen (duty-free trade zone). It is unknown if Natural de Coultre was an unwitting dupe, or in the know and now afraid. Either way they told the police that the true owner was Rexim. Rexim told the West German police that the 20mm ammunition was a reduced-energy, non-combat training type specified by Guatemala and should be allowed through, and that Guatemala had already paid a $16,000 deposit on it.

Considering that Guatemala was already sitting on tons of useless AA ammo, they clearly had not bought more. There are two possibilities. One is that Rexim was going to try ripping off Guatemala a second time. The other is that Rexim was lying to the West Germans, and it really was good warshot 20mm. The matter went unresolved because eleven days later Árbenz was overthrown and Armas’s new pro-American government voided the contract.

For readers wondering, Rexim no longer exists. After making money dealing WWII-era arms, Rexim decided the next step should be to manufacture their own new ones. A submachine gun called the Favor sold poorly. Undeterred, they aimed for a world-class assault rifle called the Direx to compete with the CETME, AK-47, and FN FAL. The Direx’s R&D expenses grew out of control and drove Rexim into insolvency during 1957.

the FFV deal

On his own initiative Col. Rogelio Cruz Ver, head of the Guardia Civil, arranged a 1953 gun buy from Foravarets Fabriksverk (FFV), the huge Swedish defense conglomerate. Col. Cruz obtained a debit memo against the government account at Banco Agricola Mercantil in Guatemala City. This was structured into a three-way, dollar-denominated LOC (irrevocable letter of credit) of himself, Chase Manhattan Bank in the USA, and FFV in Sweden. The guns would originate in Stockholm, Sweden; crossdeck uninspected to a second freighter at the Hamburg Friehafen in West Germany, then be delivered to Guatemala. The main item was 200 WWII German MP-40 submachine guns and 288,310 rds of 9mm Parabellum to fill them. How or when FFV in Sweden (neutral during WWII) obtained hundreds of MP-40s is unknown.

(MP-40s displayed in Guatemala City after “PBSUCCESS” in 1954. These could have come from either the FFV buy or the Alfhem affair.) (Associated Press photo)

Col. Cruz gave instructions to the H.F. Cordes & Co. steamship line that “POLICE USE ONLY” appear on the bill of lading and crates. The shipment made it through. The LOC was in excess of what FFV invoiced for the WWII guns and Col. Cruz simply stole the difference.

The MP-40s were much appreciated by Guatemalan soldiers, who considered them superb submachine guns.

the Alfhem affair

Already by 1953 American policy basically amounted to an arms embargo. That year it was de jure made formal, in both the primary (criminal charges against violators in the USA) and secondary (a ban on American-made weapons already abroad being resold to Guatemala). The USA strove for a tertiary embargo (allies were requested not to sell any arms to Guatemala, even their own-manufactured, or allow Guatemala-bound arms to cross in transit). This was generally successful. American diplomats broke up a weapons buy Hubert Julian negotiated in Spain, and Guatemalan deals were blocked in the Netherlands, Rhodesia, and Belgium.

With the CIA pouring on pressure and the “PBSUCCESS” operation apparently imminent in early 1954, Guatemala was running out of options to get war materials. Despite his marxist leanings Jacobo Árbenz Guzman was not really a pro-Soviet zealot and had previously ruled out the east bloc as a source. Now however, there were few alternatives.

Guatemala and Czechoslovakia had done pleasing business prior to WWII and the vz.24 rifles (still very much in use) were of good quality.

(Guatemalan soldier with vz.24 during 1953.)

It was decided to therefore try communist Czechoslovakia as a weapons source. On 21 January 1954, Col. Daniel Alfonso Martinez Estevez arrived in Prague. Col. Martinez was indeed an army colonel, but not a traditional one. Guatemala’s farm bureau gave salaried army desk jobs and army ranks as a perk to senior officials, and Col. Martinez was one of them. Árbenz selected Martinez because he was extremely trustworthy and secrecy was a must: should the Americans learn Guatemala was bringing combloc arms onto the continent, the response would be bad. Col. Martinez was loyal but had no arms procurement training. He was in way over his head dealing with the Czechoslovaks. He came with specific needs: new combat aircraft, modern rifles and artillery, armored vehicles, and ammunition.

The Czechoslovaks told Col. Martinez that what he was asking for was all sadly unavailable; however, they could still fill all of Guatemala’s defense needs, just in different ways with a different package. To use an analogy; Col. Martinez was walking into an auto dealership looking for a reliable family car, and the Czechoslovaks were the smooth-talking salesman slowly but surely convincing him that he actually wanted a motorcycle instead. They were successful.

shipping

The weapons from landlocked Czechoslovakia would ship via the Polish port of Szczecin aboard a Swedish-flagged freighter, M.S. Alfhem.

Built in 1930, M.S. Alfhem was in rough shape by 1954. It was also already known to American intelligence, having hauled Soviet weapons to Mao’s communists in China some years previous.

M.S. Alfhem was chartered by a Swedish citizen, Alfred Christensen, on behalf of Czechofracht which was communist Czechoslovakia’s national trade firm. Either Mr. Christensen or Czechofracht arranged for a “straw charter” through a British freight broker, E.E. Dean. This was done because M.S. Alfhem‘s owners demanded prepayment of the freight before loading began, but Guatemala would not pay Czechoslovakia until M.S. Alfhem departed Poland. There was literally no mechanism to transfer money between communist Czechoslovakia and the Swedish shipping line, however both had accounts with the Bank Of England. It was decided that moving British pounds between British accounts was best, and it was hoped that a British “straw charter” would obscure things.

Loading took place between 10 – 16 April 1954. The CIA was somewhat aware of what was happening and grew more suspicious: M.S. Alfhem was to sail with only 2,080t cargo of its 7,000t capacity, it refused to carry any paid mail, and was “deadheaded” (the voyage home would be empty). Normally this would make for an unprofitable trip.

M.S. Alfhem departed Szczecin on 17 April 1954. The manifest was all common consumer goods, bound for Senegal in Africa.

As M.S. Alfhem proceeded to a fueling stop in Denmark, the US Air Force noted that it was sailing an odd course, as if to skirt Sweden’s territorial seas limit. As a Swedish-flagged merchant, it would be subject to a Swedish customs inspection within that. After departing Copenhagen it sailed a logical course to Africa, until the Bay of Biscay off France, when it suddenly veered west into the open Atlantic.

This buy cost Guatemala $4,466,766 (roughly $54.53 million in 2026 dollars), for which Czechoslovakia demanded a “hard currency”, not quetzals. This was an astronomically huge spend, for comparison poor Guatemala’s entire biannual defense budget (2 years procurement, upkeep, and operating costs for army, navy, air force, and civil guard combined) was $6,000,000. Guatemala attempted to launder the money. Originating as Guatemalan quetzals at Banco de Guatemala, the $4,466,766 was converted into American dollars in irregular amounts by small banks in Louisiana and New York. Because of the sum involved only a Federal Reserve bank was able to do the foreign transfer, so those shell accounts were reaggregated at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York City. On 11 March 1954, the $4,466,766 was converted into Swiss francs there and split into two exactly equal sums. Both transferred to a numbered account of Union Banque de Suisse of Switzerland. Once M.S. Alfhem left Poland, the money transferred to Statnibank in Prague.

American bankers noticed the transaction at the first step, as it exceeded 500% of the quetzal’s normal worldwide monthly forex turnover. Why Guatemala split the franc-converted final total into two big, exactly identical transfers is unclear; that probably attracted more attention than just sending it all together at once.

the voyage concludes

Johan H. Lind, the captain of M.S. Alfhem, later claimed that he was receiving instructions by radio. Whether or not that is true will never be known. In any case the destination was changed from Dakar in Senegal to Curaçao in the Caribbean, then to Honduras, then to Guatemala. The final docking instructions (Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean coast) were not given until M.S. Alfhem was a few hours from the Guatemalan 12 NM sea limit.

Captain Lind said no charts for Puerto Barrios were aboard and he had never visited there before. He said the Guatemalans did not send a pilot boat out and he guided M.S. Alfhem to the quay by “eyeball navigation”. It is lucky that the expensive cargo was not lost to running aground in the final hours.

M.S. Alfhem docked at Puerto Barrios on 15 May 1954. The Guatemalans ordered the ship unloaded round-the-clock until it was empty. The cargo filled 123 railroad cars (ironically owned by IRCA, a subsidiary of United Fruit, which was agitating for Árbenz’s overthrow).

early CIA response

By early May the CIA was certain that weapons were aboard M.S. Alfhem. After a suggestion that the US Navy mine Puerto Barrios was refused, it was attempted to disrupt the unloading diplomatically. Time was wasted in London before it was discovered that the E.E. Dean straw charter was bogus. The CIA tried pressuring the ship’s insurer to cancel its policy, which should have made it “untouchable” to longshoremen. Finally the State Department requested Sweden order the ship to cease unloading; by then it was too late.

In hindsight some of this is foolish; for example if the insurance was cancelled the Guatemalans would have ordered unloading to continue anyways, probably at gunpoint if necessary.

It was attempted to destroy the cargo three times via derailment. Twice anti-Árbenz dissidents couldn’t find the train. The third time the dynamite failed to go off and the saboteur opened fire on the locomotive, resulting in the deaths of himself and one Guatemalan guard. The cargo was undamaged.

intelligence is not always an exact science

Some errors in initial reports of the cargo seem almost comical now, but it should be remembered that the CIA was amassing data from many sources: “humint assets” (spies), United Fruit employees in Puerto Barrios, moles in the Guatemalan army, signals intercepts, and so on. Not all of these people were experts in WWII weapons.

what was in the shipment?

Below is the full list from the CIA’s secret (declassified in 2003) report of 21 June 1954, and then a line-by-line breakdown. Almost all of it was leftover WWII German kit.

After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992, outlines of the shipment were found in the Czech Republic’s archives, rounding out what it really was.

item 1) 98k / vz.98N rifles

The bolt-action 98k was Germany’s main WWII firearm from start to finish. It fired the 7.92 Mauser cartridge (2,493fps muzzle velocity) from a stripper-loaded 5 rds internal magazine.

The designation vz.98N was used by Czechoslovakia after WWII for both surrendered ex-German 98ks and their own postwar production. Germany had manufactured 98ks at Brno during WWII. The production jigs and even in-process rifles were surrendered intact there in May 1945. Post-May 1945 vz.98Ns resemble “kriegsmodell” 98ks, later-WWII German rifles with simplified and somewhat cruder construction. In the Alfhem shipment were both wartime and postwar guns.

(Guatemalan vz.98N rifle. Like kriegsmodell 98ks, this one lacks the takedown disc in the stock, that job accomplished by the small hole in the buttcap.)

The CIA’s caliber is wrong, the Czechoslovak guns were German 7.92x57mm Mauser not the Latin American 7x57mm. The magazine size is also wrong, they were 5 rds not 7 rds. The CIA estimated that “about 10,000” were shipped; the Czechoslovak records state 7,000 rifles. This alone would be enough to equip roughly a third of the Guatemalan army.

items 2) and 3) MG-34 machine guns

The MG-34 was a very high-quality machine gun and in some respects, the foundation of the modern GPMG (general purpose machine gun) concept. WWII German production switched to the MG-42 mid-war but MG-34s served on until the very end, and a decent number ended up in Czechoslovak hands in 1945. These fired the 7.92 Mauser cartridge at 800rpm cyclical. They were belt-fed, either 50 or 250 rds belts, or a Gurttrommel which was a snail-like encased 50 rds belt.

(MG-34s from the Alfhem shipment displayed in Guatemala City after the 1954 “PBSUCCESS” operation ousted Árbenz.)

The CIA’s caliber note is curious; in any case they used 7.92 Mauser not 7x57mm and certainly not 9mm Parabellum pistol rounds. How on earth that was deduced is anybody’s guess. Item 3) was just MG-34s on the Lafette 34 mounting, not a different weapon type.

The June 1954 CIA report stated “an unknown number” of these machine guns, with no ammunition. The Czechoslovak records state 1,000 MG-34s (not differentiated between with/without tripod) along with 20,000,000 rds of 7.92 Mauser. The Czechoslovak records state it was not surrendered German ammo but rather postwar Czechoslovak-made M-47 FMJ ball.

item 4) unknown

This is interesting because nothing in the Czechoslovak records match it and its hard to even guess what possibly could. Supposedly it was an autorifle resembling the WWII American M1918 BAR, except that it fed from a sideways mounted “clip” (sic). The first thing that comes to mind is the WWII German FG-42.

(Captured FG-42 being tested by the US Army.)

Only about 5,000 of these were made during WWII. The USSR certainly had some, which they provided to North Vietnam during the late 1950s. Perhaps Czechoslovakia had a few after 1945 but it would have been proportionally less then the few even the Soviets had. Moreover the FG-42 was worldwide considered an exemplary firearm and it seems unlikely Czechoslovakia would have mixed them in to the bric-a-brac they sold Guatemala. The FG-42 was not in the Czechoslovak records, was never in the Guatemalan army’s TO&E, and was never photographed in use there.

Other than that, looking at what the Czechoslovaks had for sale in the early 1950s, nothing seems to match the CIA’s description. The MG-35/36A was an obscure WWII German weapon of that configuration used in very small numbers by Waffen-SS units in Russia and by the Wehrmacht occupation force in Norway. Few if any ever passed through Czechoslovakia. Nothing else in the WWII German lineup seems to fit either.

A third (and most likely) possibility is that this is an “intelligence phantom” which never existed. Perhaps a CIA asset on the ground in Puerto Barrios saw an uncrated Gewehr 43 laying on its side with the magazine out, and “put too much thinking into it”.

Guatemala would later get actual WWII American BARs, 584 of the M1918A2 version. These deliveries did not start until 1963 – 1964, still then a decade in the future.

item 5) PaK 36 anti-tank guns

Here the CIA’s assessment was right on the money, these were German WWII PaK 36 towed anti-tank guns.

(This one was later retrofitted in Guatemala for American hubs and tires; they were delivered in 1954 still with German wheels. This is one of several preserved today in Guatemala. Behind it is a WWII American M8 Greyhound.)

The PaK 36 fired a 37x249mm(R)-AP cartridge at 2,500fps muzzle velocity. During the first three years of WWII it was decently effective, thereafter it had problems with the T-34 and M4 Sherman. Still it remained in German use until WWII’s end and Czechoslovakia inherited a substantial number in 1945. Škoda made this ammunition after WWII.

The 1954 CIA report said “an unknown number”. In this instance the Czechoslovak records are little help, they didn’t give a number and furthermore, called the PaK 36s “3,7cm Škoda KPÚV 34”. There really was a pre-WWII anti-tank gun named that, but it had nothing in common and this was apparently a security ploy – despite the whole shipment being secret anyways. The CIA felt no 37mm ammo was provided however the Czechoslovak records indicate 30,000 rds.

item 6) le.IG 18 field guns

For certain, this is the most surprising thing aboard M.S. Alfhem. These were WWII German 75mm Leicht Infanteriegeschütz 18s, aka the le.IG 18.

(Wehrmacht le.IG 18 in action during WWII.)

This curious weapon predated the Third Reich, entering service during 1932. The idea was that instead of calling for artillery support, infantry might have with them something small and nimble, but that exceeded mortars and grenades, to immediately put into action themselves. The le.IG 18 weighed 880 lbs but meticulously balanced, in that one average soldier could pick up the trails and spin it in bearing. The whole thing could be animal-towed or pushed short distances by its own crew. The baseline version (of which all of Guatemala’s were) had steel-coated wood wheels; some others later in WWII had tires for motorized towing. During WWII 9,037 of the baseline wood-wheel version and about 2,900 of the motorized-tow version were made.

(Guatemalan le.IG 18s during 1954. This was an exhibition after the overthrow of Árbenz, Armas’s new regime was seeking to embarrass its predecessor with the wastefulness of the Alfhem buy.)

The le.IG 18 fired a unique 75mm round, the shell was 13 lbs and had a 22 yds lethal radius. Prior to firing, between one to five propellant discs screwed into a cup; this along with barrel elevation gave the desired range, with 2 miles being the maximum. At extreme upper (+75°) elevation, the le.IG 18 could be used like a mortar. The action was unusual, the breech was fixed and the chamber popped up, like a break-open shotgun.

These were useful during Germany’s campaigns in Poland, Norway, and the Low Countries. They were less successful in North Africa and the USSR where battle ranges were often wider. Late in WWII Germany ceased issue, instead substituting an extra 120mm mortar platoon to each battalion. None the less le.IG 18s remained in use until the end. There were surrendered or captured examples in both the USSR and Czechoslovakia after 1945.

(The gunshield was not for styling. A 1930s Rheinmetall experiment showed that even in colorblind persons, it is easier to discern straight lines in foliage rather than curves. Hence the gunshield was given wavy edges. This is one of several preserved today in Guatemala.)

The CIA felt that there were 100 of these guns aboard M.S. Alfhem. They shipped in pyramidical wood crates (presumably the trails disassembled and set upright on the gunshield) marked “Belgium” and with a champagne glass sticker, the international shipping shorthand for fragile goods. One hundred is a big estimate and if true, may have represented all that remained in Czechoslovakia. The CIA was pretty adamant in this, citing numerous intelligence sources all indicating 100. They might not have been wrong, as it was said that four railroad flatbeds moved them; dividing out a car’s square footage area that equals 92 -100 of the pyramidical crates.

(Guatemalan le.IG 18s.)

Here again the Czechoslovak records are of no use. They manifested as “Škoda Vzor 18N 7,5cm protiletadlové” (Škoda Model 18N 75mm anti-aircraft), a non-existent thing, with no quantity listed. However the records do state 28,000 rds of the unique ammunition were provided.

item 7) Granatwerfer 34 mortars

Here the CIA wasn’t very specific, yet still correct. These were WWII German 8cm GrW. 34 mortars.

These had a range of up to 1,310 yds. Despite the 80mm designation the bomblet was actually 81.4mm (3 1⁄5″) diameter. This was a high-quality mortar and after WWII, was used by the Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav armies in Europe.

(GrW. 34 from the Alfhem shipment displayed in Guatemala during 1954, along with MG-34s and MP-40s.)

The 1954 CIA report only said “many” of these but no ammunition. The Czechoslovak records indicate 100 mortars and 52,000 rds of ammunition.

item 8) vz.34 hand grenades

These were the only item in the Alfhem shipment not of WWII German design. They were Škoda vz.34 grenades.

In the CIA report, they are described as the business end of a WWII German Stielhandgranate 43 without the wood handle. Based on appearance alone that is not a bad guess.

(The Guatemalan army actually had a few of those as well, a small lot bought third-hand from Argentina earlier in the 1950s.)

However these were their own separate thing. The vz.34 was a pre-WWII Czechoslovak grenade, made between 1934 – 1938. They saw some WWII German use. The production jigs survived WWII and in 1945, Czechoslovakia again restarted production which ran through the late 1940s.

During 1954 the CIA said only “a large number” were aboard M.S. Alfhem and indeed it was: 100,000 to be exact. Of interest the CIA indicated that no training booklets were sent. The vz.34 operates quite differently than say, the WWII American Mk2 pineapple. There is no delay spoon, pulling the pin arms the fuze, which detonates upon sharp impact or it being shaken while held. If no instructional literature was provided, that must have been interesting.

item 9) Tellermines

Here again the CIA was right on the money. These were WWII German Tellermine T.Mi. Z-43 anti-tank mines.

This was an exceptionally effective WWII mine. The 12¼ lbs TNT warhead would destroy any Allied vehicle. It had an antitamper second fuze which detonated if it was attempted to disable the pressure plate, the normal method of disarming an anti-tank mine. It could be fitted with a tiltrod adapter. Between 220 – 400 lbs pressure was needed, so it was not suitable for anti-personnel use.

The CIA did not offer a quantity estimate in 1954, perhaps because it was so many: 10,000 in all, easily much more than Guatemala’s existing mine inventory of all types combined.

in the shipment, but not in the CIA report

The Gewehr 43, or G.43, was Germany’s WWII semi-auto rifle. Only 402,713 were made as production took longer and was more expensive than both the bolt-action 98k and the StG-44 assault rifle. It used the 7.92 Mauser cartridge and had a 10 rds magazine.

Included in the Alfhem shipment were 3,000 of these fine rifles.

(Guatemalan soldier with a G.43.)

This would account for the “extra” 3,000 guns in the CIA’s estimate for the 98ks / vz.98Ns.

Also in the shipment was an unknown number of MP-40s to join those already in Guatemala from the FFV buy. Both Czechoslovakia’s army and police used surrendered MP-40s after WWII.

(MP-40s from the Alfhem shipment displayed in Guatemala City during 1954, along with G.43s, 98ks, and MG-34s.)

Czechoslovakia also sold 2,000,000 9mm Parabellum rounds to go with these.

predicted by the CIA, but not in the shipment

(Czechoslovak air force MiG-15.)

The CIA was convinced that warplanes, specifically MiG-15 jet fighters, were going to be aboard M.S. Alfhem. However there were no warplanes of any type.

The heavily-redacted paragraph above, declassified during 2003, shows the expectation and uncertainty. Estimates ranged from zero MiG-15s to ten, fourteen, or fifteen aboard M.S. Alfhem. It stated that twenty bombers might be included, or perhaps five WWII Spitfires.

The MiG-15 was a frontline fighter in the Czechoslovak air force and they would not have sold any in 1954, least of all to Guatemala, even if the USSR allowed that, which it wouldn’t have. Beyond that there were only a dozen fighter pilots in Guatemala, none of which had ever flown a jet. The concern seems needless.

The CIA also expected tanks and anti-aircraft systems to be aboard. There were none.

(As of 2026 confirmation is still forthcoming for “Super Gun machine guns”.)

As the final days to the “PBSUCCESS” operation ticked down, there seemed to be a near-hysteria inside the CIA, where most any intel lead regarding Guatemala was worthy of review.

the Alfhem shipment inside Guatemala

Jacobo Árbenz Guzman planned to use the Alfhem shipment in establishment of a “people’s militia”, bypassing the army chain of command as deterrent to a coup. The army learned of this and was enraged. Military leadership told Árbenz that he could have his praetorian guard, or have his army’s loyalty, but not necessarily both. Árbenz dropped the idea. Once M.S. Alfhem was unloaded, Árbenz ordered the weapons to be unnaturally split 40/40/20 between three different commands, so that no one unit would be overwhelmingly stronger than any other.

A footnote in the CIA assessment stated that one intelligence source observed some le.IG 18 artillery pieces being taken individually to private homes of army officers. That would be bizarre.

During this process Árbenz made an error in judgement, boasting that the shipment had cost $10 million (124% above the true cost, itself unimaginably expensive). Apparently he hoped to “wow” the army with a big-number investment, but as explained below that was not the effect.

Guatemalan army opinions on the WWII German weapons

Suffice to say, it was not good. The Alfhem shipment added three new ammunition calibers to the Guatemalan army’s already-overstretched and inadequate logistics system.

The 98k / vz.98N rifles were a disappointment. The army was hoping to soon get something like the FN FAL or G3. Other than requiring a different caliber, nothing about a WWII 98k was different than Guatemala’s existing vz.24s, in fact they basically were the same rifle.

(Guatemalan soldiers with a MG-34 and 98ks during the mid-1950s. The M1 pot helmets, web gear, and canteens are all of WWII American origin.)

The PaK 36 anti-tank guns were themselves fine, but Guatemala faced little regional armored threat. A lot of disappointment was directed at the le.IG 18s.

(Guatemalan le.IG 18 during the 1950s.)

These could not be towed by motor vehicles. Perhaps a dozen might be shoehorned into the TO&E somewhere but there was no need whatsoever for a hundred, especially at the high price Czechoslovakia charged. The Tellermines were considered a waste; they were great mines but the quantity purchased was absurd and far beyond what Guatemala would ever need. The Granatwerfer 34s were nice however Guatemala already had an excess of mortars, in too many different types, but already a shortage of well-trained mortarmen.

The G.43 rifles, MG-34 machine guns, and MP-40 submachine guns were all viewed positively.

(MP-40 displayed in a Guatemalan museum. The Beretta PM12 below it was its eventual replacement in service.)

None of the army’s biggest preexisting needs: vehicles, warplanes, radios, and air defense systems; were met in the shipment. The main anger was the appalling total cost, which was aggravated by Árbenz’s false “$10 million” boast. Unless some miraculous new revenue source was identified, it was unlikely there could be any new weapons bought for years down the road. Another frustration was the top-down procurement, which prevented the usual bribery senior officers indulged in during arms buys.

The overall feeling was that Guatemala had been taken advantage of again.

Altogether between Hubert Julian, Rexim, and the big Czechoslovak buy; impoverished Guatemala’s weapons purchases had blown through $5.31 million (about $73.1 million in 2026 money) in five years with nothing really spectacular to show for it.

M.S. Alfhem

M.S. Alfhem had by now departed. The Swedish government radioed the ship that it must not evade any American attempt to board it. As the freighter arced between the Florida Keys and Cuba, it was indeed stopped.

(A US Coast Guard 52-Footer circles M.S. Alfhem.) (photo via Key West Independent newspaper)

U.S. Customs searched the ship thoroughly but found nothing incriminating. Captain Lind gave a deposition to a Monroe County, FL judge. He said he had no foreknowledge that weapons were aboard or that Guatemala would be the destination. He said his first indication that something was amiss was when the freight expeditor at Puerto Barrios looked worried and told him he would not get involved with the unloading.

A sailor aboard M.S. Alfhem said that the crew had opened some crates en route and discovered that it was weapons, but by then could not do anything about it. He said the crew debated demanding a seafarer’s explosive cargo bonus, but decided with the guns already unloaded, nobody would pay it now so why bother.

The USA’s government did not believe Lind’s story but having found no evidence, had no basis to detain him or the ship. M.S. Alfhem was never again newsworthy and was scrapped in 1961.

operation “PBSUCCESS”

The CIA’s overthrow of Árbenz during late June 1954 was a fiasco that basically succeeded in spite of itself. The Liberaciónistas guerilla force of Carlos Armas planned a four-prong invasion. The two southern groups were arrested by Salvadoran police before they even started off. The main eastern force was crushed by the Guatemalan army. The small center force however, overran a border base and then took the city of Chicuimula 19 miles deep into Guatemala. This set off a snowball-effect panic in the Guatemalan officer corps, which considering that the Liberaciónistas were teetering on total defeat, was unwarranted.

Little of the Alfhem load had been integrated into the army by then. Most senior officers disliked Árbenz and were in no hurry to defend his presidency, and most were still displeased at the expensive Czechoslovak buy.

(Guatemala’s Cuartel de Matamoros base during PBSUCCESS in 1954, with a knocked-out le.IG 18 and abandoned PaK 36.) (photo via Life magazine)

(Guatemalan soldiers during PBSUCCESS, with a MG-34 and MP-40. The carbine is an American M1 from WWII Lend-Lease, as are the M1 pot helmets and M1936 web belts.)

Had Árbenz’s plan for a people’s militia gone through, the pitiful Liberaciónista force could have been handled easily with or without the army. As it was, most of the Alfhem weapons never left storage in 1954, when they were most needed.

The officer corps decided that Árbenz was finished, either now or by some future CIA effort, and turned against him. He resigned on 27 June 1954, only nine days after “PBSUCCESS” began.

During the late summer of 1954 the new pro-American government of Carlos Armas (who would be assassinated in 1957) exhibited the Alfhem shipment to British newsmen, to illustrate the perceived wastefulness of the previous regime. On one of the le.IG 18s, an officer removed a muzzle shipping seal and ran his finger around the bore, revealing cosmoline. It had not even been proof-fired since leaving Czechoslovakia.

even more 98ks

Germany’s WWII rifle would make another “debut” in Guatemala years later. Israel and Guatemala had a good relationship, and the Guatemalans looked to Israel as a source of “near-American” current-generation weapons, without needing to deal with the U.S. Congress. Israel leased rooms in the Cortijo Reforma Hotel across the street from the army’s GHQ, and had arms dealers “on duty” there. The main item exported was Galil assault rifles and Uzi SMGs. However the Israelis discovered that Guatemala had lapsed into “old habits”, haphazard arms buys, and would purchase pretty much anything offered.

(The “scrubbed” top of an ex-German, ex-Israeli Guatemalan 98k.)

One such thing was 98ks which had been rechambered to 7.62 NATO. These came in two main batches; the first in 1967. That year, the U.S. Congress put an “external cap” on Central American arms buys, above which American aid would be equally reduced to that nation. Guatemala and Israel evaded this by classifying the 98ks as “police equipment”. The second and larger batch came when President Carter ordered a total embargo of American firearms to Guatemala. These 98ks were brokered by “Eagle Enterprises” of Ashdod, Israel which may have been an IDF front company. Starting in 1977, shipments ran through 1983 and were probably the entirety of Israel’s remaining 98ks.

(The “XELA” marking means it was assigned to the Quetzaltenango area of western Guatemala. This had been a “kriegsmodell” 98k, with the buttstock hole substituting the takedown disc.)

Guatemala assigned many to the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil effort which began in 1981. These units were press-ganged civilians who were given a rifle and a few rounds of ammo, and patrolled for “tours” lasting between 12 – 36 hours, upon which they had to return the gun and ammo. Pay was haphazard and often nothing.

(Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil member being issued a 98k. For this effort the Guatemalan army normally issued M1 Garands. If unavailable, the 7.62 NATO ex-Israeli 98ks were issued.)

This form of military service was abolished by Guatemala in 1996.

what happened to all the weapons from the Alfhem affair?

Now again an American ally the Guatemalan military needed rebuilding, in particular the worthless Guatemalan air force which would be restarted from the ground up. That would cost $400,000. President Eisenhower’s intelligence advisor Allen Dulles suggested that either the Defense or State departments buy the Alfhem shipment for $400,000, then immediately bill Guatemala that amount for American aircraft. He suggested that it first be investigated if the weapons were usable by the United States, and if not, if a “denial purchase” (low-dollar buy to take weapons off the black market) be considered. The CIA examined the weapons in Guatemala and in December 1954, replied negatively.

(The declassified memo is still heavily redacted. “WH” is western hemisphere, not White House.)

Two years past the end of the Korean War, WWII German arms were of zero American usefulness. As for the denial purchase, American law required those to touch American soil. The memo urged that beyond the $400,000 the additional expenses of collecting weapons from all over Guatemala and then shipping it to the USA for disposal, be considered.

On a smaller scale something like this idea was done. The arms dealer Sam Cummings did a barter offset for WWII-surplus M1 Garands the Guatemalans wanted. He took in return all of Guatemala’s old Steyr MP-34s, Mauser Mod. 1910s, Remington Rolling Blocks, and vz.33s, most of the vz.24s; all the Mosin-Nagants inherited from the “PBSUCCESS” guerillas; and some obsolete light artillery and old ammunition. However it does not appear that he took much from the Alfhem shipment.

The 98ks / vz.98Ns saw short frontline use as Guatemala rapidly shifted to the M1 Garand as its standard longarm. By the mid-1970s there were enough Galils that M1 Garands could displace 98ks in secondary or reserve units.

(98ks were still in ceremonial and drill use during the 1980s. Guatemala’s current ceremonial rifle in 2026 is the M1 Garand.) (image via Macneil/Lehrer Newshour)

During the 1990s Century Arms bought pretty much any ATF Class I-eligible thing available from Guatemala; mainly any remaining vz.24s and most of the 98ks.

The G.43s were well liked rifles through the late 1960s. Guatemala still had some in reserve storage past the year 2000.

(Guatemalan soldier with a G.43 during the 1960s. There was instability during 1960, again during 1963, and then a three-decade civil war.)

The MP-40s were tremendously liked, even as a slew of submachine gun types (Madsen M46/53s from the “PBSUCCESS” force, then M1A1 Thompsons, Beretta PM12s, Uzis, and Ingram MAC-10s) followed. Both the army and Policia Nacional used MP-40s. During 1971 the security force assigned to guard foreign embassies in Guatemala City still carried MP-40s.

(These guns were seized during the 1963 coup, when the army took power to block a socialist candidate who appeared certain to win the election. Other than the Armalite AR-10s it is like a museum of WWII: four MG-34s, a MP-40, two M3A1s, and a M50 Reising.) (photo by Don Uhrbrock)

(MP-40 displayed by Guatemala’s Military History Service during 2023.)

The MG-34s were also well-liked. These remained in use even as WWII-surplus M1919s came via American military aid, and served until the early 1970s.

(A member of the RM Guatemalteco (military reserves) marches with a MG-34 during the 1960s. These men drilled in civilian clothes.)

Little was said about the PaK 36s after 1954. Guatemala apparently liked them enough to retrofit some with aftermarket wheels for higher tow speeds. Several of these are today preserved in Guatemala.

(Like the one shown earlier, this PaK 36 was retrofitted with American hubs and tires.)

Most astonishingly, the le.IG 18s remained on the army’s TO&E until 1982, and then in reserve until 1984.

Assuming any training at all was done, Guatemala must have been running down the ammo shipped with them in 1954. Several are preserved today in Guatemala.

(A le.IG 18 featured in a 2025 newscast about Guatemala’s national military museum.)

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postscript

Nothing from the Alfhem shipment is still in Guatemalan use during 2026. Some of it still exists in a most unwanted way.

During 2009 police in Cobán, Guatemala recovered stolen or misappropriated army gear believed to have been bound for the Los Zetas drug cartel in Mexico. Along with eight M18 Claymores and body armor, were eight MP-34s from the Alfhem shipment. The belted ammo is all 7.62 NATO and could not be used in the MG-34s. Guatemala has recently clamped down on security of army stores however that can not “undo” six previous decades of corruption and negligence.

(photo via CGTN news)

The MG-34 above was seized by the Mexican marine corps from the Jalisco Nueva Generación cartel during 2012. It came from the Alfhem shipment. The Sinola cartel also had a MG-34 via Guatemala, while Los Zetas had a MP-40 from the Alfhem shipment.