Category: Anti Civil Rights ideas & “Friends”

This could happen near your home so be careful out there! Video Shows BLM Protesters Trapping Motorists and Brandishing Guns, What Police Do Has People Talking By Bonchie

BREAKING: Plano, TX police officer allows armed left-wing militia to illegally block traffic, reprimands driver who attempts to clear road, defend himself pic.twitter.com/2YTE0dvo9S

— Jack Poso 🇺🇸 (@JackPosobiec) May 8, 2021

If people thought the aggression of Black Lives Matter couldn’t happen in a red state like Texas, they were wrong. A new, viral video shows BLM protesters blocking traffic and brandishing guns in an attempt to intimidate those trying to get through in Plano, TX.

As a note for accuracy about who these protesters actually are, multiple Black Lives Matter shirts are visible. The signs being held up also indicate their allegiances.

At one point, you can see one of the protesters point a gun at the man who is yelling at them to move out of the road. But it’s what the police do that really has people talking.

Instead of trying to clear the street, the officer just stands there and only gets involved to deal with the driver. While it’s obvious he’s trying to keep things from escalating, that’s no excuse to stand idly by when unlawful behavior is clearly happening.

In response to this video, I’ve seen several BLM supporters claim that the protesters have a right to be armed. That’s true, but pretending anything in that video is legal shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how open carry (or any carry of a firearm) works. One of the things that a firearms instructor will drill into you is that you can not instigate a confrontation and then finish it with a gun while claiming self-defense. In this case, you can’t block traffic, entrap people, and then threaten them with a firearm. You certainly can’t shoot anyone in that situation. Once you instigate a confrontation as the BLM protesters did, the legal hurdles to claim self-defense become massively high.

Further, I want to note that there is no situation in Texas where a protest can legally block a roadway. Even if this protest was originally permitted, it had reached the point of law-breaking by the time the camera started rolling. Police should have moved to clear the road to de-escalate the situation. Instead, nothing was done until motorists started to get into it with protesters. That’s a failure of the police to do their jobs, likely due to restrictions placed on them further up the food chain.

This kind of lawless mob behavior is not just limited to urban centers. Plano is an affluent, Dallas suburb. If local authorities don’t get control, things are going to get out of hand, and people are going to die.

All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

Its funny right now but I am really afraid that this will happen in a neighborhood near you!

Post author By Grumpy
Post date May 8, 2021
No Comments on Its funny right now but I am really afraid that this will happen in a neighborhood near you!

A Victory! All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

Glock wins (and Biden loses) in major liability suit by Paul Bedard

Post author By Grumpy
Post date May 8, 2021
No Comments on Glock wins (and Biden loses) in major liability suit by Paul Bedard

God didn’t deliver for President Joe Biden, who recently begged “the Lord” to help him erase the congressionally approved immunity that gun-makers have from lawsuits.

In a little-noticed decision with a major impact on the firearms industry, a federal judge in Arizona has ruled in favor of pistol manufacturer Glock and dismissed a suit brought by the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence on behalf of a man who was accidentally shot and paralyzed.

U.S. District Court Judge Susan Brnovich upheld liability immunity granted in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act passed in 2005 to block gun-makers from a potential wave of industry-killing lawsuits.

Brnovich, nominated by former President Donald Trump and the wife of Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich, dismissed multiple claims in the suit that the act’s protections were illegal, writing, “The statute is constitutional.”

While she made her decision in mid-March, it is just now winning attention as Biden and top congressional Democrats begin a campaign to impose new gun control restrictions and end liability immunity for gun-makers.

“The dismissal of this case is welcome news and demonstrates the importance of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,” said Mark Oliva, the spokesman for the industry trade group National Shooting Sports Foundation.

“These attempts to hold manufacturers responsible for the criminal and negligent misuse of firearms are misguided and are attempts at legislation through litigation. The PLCAA law was passed with a bipartisan majority in both chambers of Congress to keep activists from attempting to bankrupt firearm manufacturers by tying them up in court with unfounded claims. This demonstrates why protecting this legislation against attacks by President Biden and gun control factions in Congress is critical,” he added.

Last month, Biden falsely claimed that the firearms industry is “the only industry in America” that can’t be sued, and he called for divine intervention to end that.

During a Rose Garden event, he said, “This is the only outfit that is exempt from being sued. If I get one thing on my list, (if) the Lord came down and said, ‘Joe, you get one of these,’ give me that one.” He added, “Because I tell you what, there would be a come-to-the-Lord moment these folks would have, real quickly.”

The suit was filed against Glock, an Austrian gun-maker, on behalf of Carlos Travieso Jr., who was in a car with others returning from a church retreat in 2018. Another teenager found the 9 mm pistol in the car and apparently thought it was safe because the magazine holding the bullets was missing. However, there was a bullet in the chamber, and when she pulled the trigger, it hit Travieso, paralyzing him.

The suit charged that Glock, the No. 1 firearms manufacturer in U.S. sales, did not have adequate safety features on the gun warning that a live round was in the chamber. The pistol does have a chamber indicator, but the suit said the gun was defective because it did not include other warnings or safeties.

Glock said it was covered by the immunity act because the shooting was a criminal act.

Oliva told Secrets, “This is an example of lawyers attempting to put the blame for negligent use of a firearm on a manufacturer. The facts of the case are clear. The negligent mishandling of a firearm resulted in tragic effects. There was no defect in the product, design flaw, and as the opinion clearly notes, claims of warning notifications do not make for a claim of product defect.”

Brnovich agreed with Glock in her victory for the Second Amendment. She also noted that even the liberal U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly rejected challenges to immunity for gun-makers.

“A fair reading of the PLCAA shows that Congress intended the scope of its preemption to include claims like the plaintiff’s. The PLCAA’s plain text extends preemption to plaintiff’s tort and products liability claims. Its unambiguous terms bar any civil cause of action, regardless of the underlying theory, when a plaintiff’s injury results from ‘the criminal or unlawful misuse’ of the person or a third party, unless a specific exception applies,” she wrote.

No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMBUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Traviesov.Glock Inc.

Decided Mar 10, 2021

No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB03-10-2021Carlos Daniel Travieso, Plaintiff, v. Glock Incorporated, et al., Defendants.Honorable Susan M. Brnovich United StatesDistrict Judge

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant, Glock Incorporated’s, Motion to Dismiss for Failure toState a Claim and pursuant to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”).(Doc. 19.) Plaintiff filed a response, (Doc. 21),and Defendant has filed a reply. (Doc. 25.) Part of Plaintiff’s response challenged the constitutionalityof the PLCAA,15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903. (Doc. 21at 13-17.) As such, the United States hasintervened pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) andFed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(c) and 24(a)(1) to defend theconstitutionality of the statute. (Doc. 30.) Oralargument on the matter was held on February 12,2021, and after hearing from all parties, the Courttook the matter under advisement. (Doc. 37.) TheCourt now issues the following decision.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 17, 2018, Plaintiff, Carlos DanielTravieso, was shot in the back with a Glock 19nine-millimeter handgun (“the handgun”). Theshooting occurred while Plaintiff was travellinghome from a youth camping trip in a churchleader’s vehicle. (Doc. 1 at 8.) The handgun wasalso in the vehicle. (

. at 7.) By way of facts notclear in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, a fourteen-year-old girl (“the Shooter”) who was in the vehiclecame into possession of the handgun. (

.) Whilethe Shooter possessed the handgun, it discharged,firing the live round in its chamber. (

.) Plaintiff was hit by the round in his back and sufferednumerous severe spinal injuries and injuries to hisorgans, including injuries that rendered him a paraplegic. (

. at 8-9.)

No criminal charges were filed against any partyconnected to the shooting. (

.) Plaintiff’sComplaint alleges that the handgun’s magazinehad been removed. (Doc. 1 at 8.) The Complaintfurther contends that, due to the absence of amagazine, the Shooter was deceived into believingthe magazine was empty, even though a live roundremained in the chamber. (

.) Plaintiff allegesthat at the time of the shooting, the gun had not been modified in any significant way and retainedthe same features and “lack of safety features andwarnings” as it did when manufactured and sold.(

. at 7-8.)This alleged lack of safety features is the center of Plaintiff’s suit. Plaintiff asserts his shooting“resulted from the negligent, reckless,unnecessary, and unreasonably dangerous actionsof Defendants, including their design,manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and sale of a handgun without a magazine disconnect safety,effective loading chamber indicator, internal lock,or other safety features that would have preventedit from being fired by a child or any other personwho did not have proper authority or maturity touse it, or effective warnings.” (

. at 12.) Plaintiff brings four claims against the Defendants. Hisfirst claim alleges that Defendants are liable to

him under a theory of strict products liability based on the defective design of their product. (

.at 17-20.) Second, he alleges that Defendants areliable to him under a theory of strict productsliability for an “information defect” and the failureto place adequate warnings on their product. (

. at21-24.) Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims are for negligence rather than for strict products liability.(

. at 24-25.) His third claim alleges Defendantshad a duty not to expose others to unreasonablerisks of injury and breached that duty by thenegligent design of the handgun. (

. at 24.) Hisfourth claim also alleges Defendants had a generalduty not to expose others to reasonablyforeseeable risks of injury, and that Defendants breached that

duty by “by negligentlymarketing guns,” and providing inadequatewarnings on the firearms themselves. (

. at 25-26.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages againstthe Defendants for alleged willful and wantondisregard for others. (Doc. 27-28.)

Defendant Glock Incorporated has responded tothe Complaint with a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.19), arguing Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred by the PLCAA because the Plaintiff’s shootingwas caused by the criminal act of a third party. (

.at 6) Defendant alleges the shooter’s criminal actsinclude possession of a handgun by a juvenile inviolation of18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A), possessionof a handgun by an unemancipated minor inviolation ofAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3111(A),endangerment in violation ofAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1201(A), as well as assault and aggravated assaultin violation ofAriz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1204(A)(1)& (2). (Doc. 19 at 6.)Plaintiff filed a Response, (Doc. 21), arguing thecorrect statutory construction of the PLCAAshows the statute is inapplicable to the presentcase. Plaintiff also argues that even if the generalstatute did apply, his claims are allowed under thePLCAA’s “product defect exception.” (

. at 5-8);15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). Finally, Plaintiff argues that if the PLCAA does bar its action, thenthe statute itself is unconstitutional under the Fifthand Tenth amendments to the United StatesConstitution. (Doc. 21 at 11-17.)Defendant in turn filed a Reply, (Doc. 25), arguingthat the PLCAA’s immunity clearly applies, andfurther arguing that the “product defect” exceptiondoes not apply because the shooting of Plaintiff “was caused by a volitional act that constituted acriminal offense[.]” (

. at 2-3. (quoting15 U.S.C.§ 7903(5)(A)(v))).Because Plaintiff challenged the constitutionalityof the PLCAA, the United States also intervenedto defend the PLCAA’s constitutionality. (Doc.30.) The Government argues the PLCAA is aconstitutional application of Congress’senumerated powers under the Commerce clause.(

. at 8.) Further, the Government contends thisCourt’s resolution of the constitutionality of thePLCAA is bound by the decision of the NinthCircuit in

Ileto v

Glock

, which directly rejectedPlaintiff’s arguments.565 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9thCir. 2009),

cert

denied

, 560 U.S. 924 (2010).

*44

II. Legal BackgroundA. The PLCAA

On October 26, 2005, Congress enacted thePLCAA into law. 109 P.L. 92, 119 Stat. 2095. ThePLCAA prohibits “the institution of a ‘qualifiedcivil liability action’ in any state or federal court.”15 U.S.C. § 7902(a). The act defines a “qualifiedcivil liability action” asA civil action or proceeding or anadministrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of [a firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreigncommerce]…for damages, punitivedamages, injunctive or declaratory relief,abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties,or other relief, resulting from the criminalor unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party…[.]

2Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A);

see also H

Inc

Bell Tel

.,492 U.S.229, 245 (1989); 2A SUTHERLAND,STATUTES AND STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION § 47.04, at 146 (5th ed. 1992, Norman Singer ed.). In the present case, the

7Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

language of the PLCAA’s enacting provisionsclearly shows Congress intended to preempt a broader scope of actions than those suggested bythe Plaintiff. As such, the recitation of the phrase“solely caused” in the purposes section will notcontrol the Court’s analysis.Further, Plaintiff’s suggested interpretation is agreater departure from the canon

*13

againstsurplusages because, as discussed, it renders manyof the statute’s exceptions meaningless. If theCourt were to give credence to Plaintiff’sargument that the PLCAA only bars cases wherethe harm is “solely caused” by third parties, itwould be hard pressed to explain why exceptionswere needed to allow action of negligence

per se

or negligent entrustment.15 U.S.C. § 7903(ii).Plaintiff’s proffered construction also renders the predicate exception entirely superfluous; if PLCAA preemption never covered cases allegingany wrongful conduct by a manufacturer, then theexception allowing actions for a seller’s knowingviolation of State or Federal gun laws would becompletely unneeded.15 U.S.C. § 7903(iii). Thisconstruction would also render parts of the“products liability” exception superfluous.15U.S.C. § 7903(v). The products liability exceptionstates that “where the discharge of the product wascaused by a volitional act that constituted acriminal offense, then such act

shall be considered the sole proximate cause

” of any harm.

.(emphasis added). This limitation on proximatecause would be rendered absolutely meaningless if the PLCAA in general only applied to cases whereharm was “solely caused” by a third-party badactor. The Court will not read the inclusion of “solely caused” in the statute’s purposes section torender entire sections of the statute’s enacting provisions meaningless.

3. The PLCAA’s Legislative History Does NotFavor the Plaintiff

Plaintiff argues that the legislative history of thePLCAA favors adopting his narrow interpretationof the law’s preemptive scope. Like statutory preambles, legislative history can be used toresolve ambiguous language in a statute, but doesnot control over the clear and express terms of alaw.

BedRoc Ltd

.,541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8 (2004)(“resort to legislative history

only when necessaryto interpret ambiguous statutory text

” (emphasisadded)). Further, courts must remain criticallyaware of the tendency of “[j]udicial investigationof legislative history…to become an exercise in‘looking over a crowd and picking out one’sfriends.'”

Exxon Mobil Corp

Allapattah Servs

.,545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (citing WALD, SOMEOBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OFLEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE 1981SUPREME COURT TERM, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195,214 (1983)).

*1414

It appears to the Court that, contrary to Plaintiff’ssuggestion, the legislative history of the PLCAAdoes not uniformly evidence Congress’s intent toadopt a narrow scope of preemption. Statements of multiple congressional speakers suggest thePLCAA was intended to preempt the sorts of product liability suits that might be used as aroundabout method of regulating the firearmsindustry.

See

151 Cong. Rec. 104 at S9074,S9087. Further, the legislative history of thePLCAA specifically referenced the

Ileto

case aswhat the PLCAA was intended to preempt,

Ileto

,565 F.3d at 1137 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. E2162-03), even though the

Ileto

plaintiffs had broughtclaims under established common law theories of negligence and public nuisance.For the above reasons, the Court finds thatCongress intended the preemptive scope of thePLCAA to generally bar common law cases likePlaintiff’s. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(a); 7903(5)(A). Assuch, the PLCAA requires the Court to dismissPlaintiff’s claims unless one of the exceptions toits preemption applies.

See

15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi).

C. Statutory Interpretation of the PLCAA’sProduct Liability Exception

8Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

. According to Plaintiff, this exception meansthat even if the PLCAA generally preempts casesagainst manufacturers, claims like Plaintiff’s,alleging a firearm was defectively designed, arestill allowed. In response, Defendant points outthat product liability claims are still preempted“where the discharge of the product was caused bya volitional act that constituted a criminaloffense[.]”15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). However,Plaintiff argues

*15

this “exception to theexception” does not apply because there is noclear statement of Congress’s “intent to bar products liability cases…involving anunintentional act of a juvenile.” (Doc. 21 at 10-11.) Plaintiff further argues that under the canon of meaningful variation the PLCAA’s productliability preemption should not apply to accidentalshootings by a juvenile because such shooting arenot criminal offenses under Arizona law. Finally,Plaintiff argues that his injuries were not caused by the shooter’s “volitional” act. The Court willagain examine each of the arguments in turn.Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds thescope of the PLCAA extends to common lawclaims generally, his theories of relief are stillallowed under the products liability exception tothe PLCAA.15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). The product liability exception states that the PLCAAwill not bar an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from adefect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in areasonably foreseeable manner, except thatwhere the discharge of the product wascaused by a volitional act that constituted acriminal offense, then such act shall beconsidered the sole proximate cause of anyresulting death, personal injuries or property damage…[.]

1. The Product Liability Exception and“Information Defect” Claims

Before construing the product liability exception,the Court notes this exception, by its plain terms,can do nothing to save Plaintiff’s claims based onalleged information defects or for inadequatewarnings in Defendant’s products. The NinthCircuit previously held that in passing thePLCAA, “Congress clearly intended to preemptcommon-law claims, such as general tort theoriesof liability.”

Ileto

,565 F.3d at 1135. The

Ileto

court noted this conclusion was bolstered “byCongress’ inclusion of…15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).”

. at 1135 n. 6. The court explained thespecific inclusion of15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii),allowing claims for negligence per se andnegligent entrustment, demonstrated that Congressconsciously considered how to treat tort claimsand elected to preempt all theories of relief exceptthose included in the exception.

.Under the same rational, this Court concludes thateven if the “product liability” exception allowsPlaintiff’s claim for design defect, it does notallow his claims of information defect or for inadequate warnings. Products liability claims arealmost uniformly brought on one of three theories:(1) defects in the design, (2) defects in themanufacturing process, or (3) defects based oninadequate instructions or warnings to reduce aforeseeable risk of harm posed by the product.

See

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, §2. Yet, while the PLCAA specifically creates anexception for “action[s] for…damage resultingdirectly from a

defect in design or manufacture

of the product,”15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v)(emphasis added), it has no similar exclusion for actions resulting from defective instruction or inadequate warnings. The inclusion of the

*16

“products liability” exception in15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)(v) “demonstrates that Congressconsciously considered how to treat [productsliability] claims.”

See Ileto

565 F.3d at 1135 n. 6.The fact that Congress carved out an exceptionspecifically allowing cases based on defectivedesign and manufacture without creating a similar exception for “information defect” and

9Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

“inadequate warning” claims can only lead thisCourt to presume the omission was intentional. Assuch, the Court concludes that even if it adoptsPlaintiff’s construction of the “products liability”exception, the scope of that exception will notallow Plaintiff’s information defect and inadequatewarning claims to go forward.

2. Clear Statement of Intent in15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)(v)

Plaintiff essentially reiterates his argument abovethat under the federalism canon the PLCAA must be construed narrowly. According to Plaintiff, “[the] PLCAA does not unmistakably state anintent to bar products liability cases…involving anunintentional act of a juvenile.” However, as noted

supra

, the PLCAA does contain a clear statementof Congress’s intent to preempt the states. Todetermine whether the scope of that preemptionextends to this case, the Court looks primarily tothe statute’s text and framework with the goal of reaching “”a

fair understanding of congressional purpose

.'”

Medtronic

,518 U.S. at 485-86 (quoting

Cipollone v

Liggett Group

,505 U.S. 504, 530 n.27 (1992) (emphasis added)). Though the Courtshould consider the “‘presumption against the pre-emption” in construing the scope of preemptionnarrowly,

Medtronic

Inc

.,518 U.S. at 485, theultimate goal is to discover Congress’s intent.Because of this, the Court rejects Plaintiff’sargument that his interpretation of the productsliability exception is compelled by the absence of an additional plain statement expressly extendingthe PLCAA to “cases…involving an unintentional[shooting by] a juvenile.” Instead, the Court willdetermine the scope of preemption based on itsunderstanding of Congress’s purpose.

3. Canon of Meaningful Variation

Plaintiff also argues that under the canon of meaningful variation, differences in the statute’slanguage indicate his case is allowed becausePlaintiff was shot by a juvenile. The meaningfulvariation canon states that where Congress usescertain language in one part of

*17

the statute anddifferent language in another, the variation is presumed intentional and the different wordsshould be given different meanings.

Keene Corp

United States

,508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993);

Russello v

United States

,464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

Two applicable subsections of the PLCAA havediffering language. In15 U.S.C. § 7903(5), thelaw generally preempts “civil action[s]…resultingfrom the

criminal or unlawful misuse

of aqualified product…[.]” (emphasis added).However, the products liability exception of thePLCAA only preempts actions “where thedischarge of the product was caused by avolitional act that

constituted a criminal offense

,”without mentioning the term “unlawful misuse.”15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(iv) (emphasis added).Plaintiff argues due to this difference “theexclusionary phrase of the products liabilityexception only bar[s] cases involving “criminal”discharges, while allowing cases involving“unlawful” but not “criminal” discharges.” (Doc.21 at 6.) Plaintiff argues that under Arizona law,an accidental shooting by a fourteen-year-oldwould be handled by the juvenile justice system.As such, while the shooter might be founddelinquent, she would not face an actual criminalconviction. (Doc. 21 at 7 (citingA.R.S. § 8-207(A)). Due to this, Plaintiff asserts, the shootingof the Plaintiff was not a “criminal” offense andthe product liability exception allows the suit.However, the Court disagrees.

Though not referenced by the Plaintiff, thePLCAA actually defines the term“unlawful misuse” to mean “conduct thatviolates a statute, ordinance, or regulationas it relates to the use of a qualified product.”15 U.S.C. § 7903(9). ——–

In the present case, the Court finds that theShooter’s actions consisted of a criminal offensefor the purposes of the PLCAA. As Defendantnotes, the actions of the Shooter violated multiplecriminal statutes including the federal law against possession of a handgun by a juvenile,18 U.S.C. §922(x)(2)(A), Arizona’s laws against possession of

10Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

a handgun an unemancipated juvenile,A.R.S. §13-3111(A), reckless endangerment of another person,A.R.S. § 13-1201(A), and assault andaggravated assault by recklessly causing physicalinjury,A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(1), 13-1204(A)(1) &(2). (Doc. 19 at 6.) While Plaintiff argues theShooter’s status as a juvenile means she cannot beconvicted of a criminal offense, this is bothfactually incorrect and not controlling theapplicability of

*18

the PLCAA.

Despite Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, under Arizona law the Shooter can be charged with acriminal offense.A.R.S. § 13-501(B)(4) (allowingfourteen-year -old defendants to be tried as adultswhen “accused of… [a] class 3, 4, 5 or 6 felonyinvolving a dangerous offense.”);A.R.S. § 13-105(13) (defining dangerous offense as “anoffense involving the discharge, use or threateningexhibition of a deadly weapon”). While thedecision whether to charge the Shooter as an adultis discretionary, the Court cannot believe that thePLCAA’s preemption hinges on whether the stateactually exercises this discretion of how to chargea shooter. To hinge the effect of the PLCAA on astate’s discretionary choice would be contrary toCongress’s purpose. The applicability of an actintended to preempt and prevent state actionwould be rendered entirely dependent on anindividual state officer’s charging decision. For similar reasons, the Court believes the PLCAA’s preemption of product defect cases is triggered bythe criminal nature of the volitional act, not onwhether the individual person is actually charged by the state.Further, the PLCAA’s product liability preemptionis triggered by the criminal nature of the act, notwhether the actor is or can be charged with thecrime.

Compare

15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(v)

with

7903(i). Here, even if a juvenile shooter would notface a criminal conviction, the finding of delinquency would be based on an admittedlycriminal act.

See

A.R.S. § 8-201(12);

JV-502820v

Superior Court

,181 Ariz. 243, 245 (Ariz. Ct.App. 1995). As such, the Court is convinced thatregardless of whether the Shooter would facecriminal charges, the criminal nature of the acttriggers the PLCAA’s preemption. This accordswith the result reached in other courts examiningthe application of the PLCAA to juvenile offenses.

See Adames v

Sheahan

,233 Ill. 2d 276, 309-14(2009).The canon of meaningful variation does notrequire a different result. The PLCAA defines theterm “unlawful misuse” to mean “conduct thatviolates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as itrelates to the use of a qualified product.”15U.S.C. § 7903(9) (emphasis added). Thisdefinition covers much more than conductconstituting a “criminal offense,” as there aremany acts which violate statutes and ordinances but do not trigger criminal

*19

penalties.

See

United States v

Palmer

, No. CR 09-00536 MMM,2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200428, at *13 (C.D. Cal.July 30, 2012) (citing

Mossew v

United States

,266 F. 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1920) (“By failure to provide a penalty for an infraction…the statutedoes not denounce the unlawful act as criminal.”)).So, the term of “unlawful misuse” in15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A) extended the PLCAA’s preemption notonly to cases where a third party’s act could be acriminal offense, but also to situations where theact “violate[d] a statute, ordinance, or regulation”that relates to the use of a firearm, but carries nocriminal penalties.15 U.S.C. § 7903(9).Alternatively, the products liability exceptionlimits its preemption only to situations where theact is one which consists of a criminal offense.15U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iv). This distinctionadequately explains the difference in the statue’slanguage without resort to a convoluted distinction based on the nature of criminal charges rather thanthe nature of the criminal act.

4. Defining “Volitional Act”

Plaintiff next argues his shooting was not theresult of a “volitional act,” because the Shooter didnot intend to fire the gun at the Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that “volitional” is an undefined term in the

11Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

PLCAA, but that the Court should construevolitional to mean intentional, because Arizonacourt’s use the terms “volitional” and “intentional”interchangeably. However, the Court findsPlaintiff’s argument unavailing.First, while the term “volitional” often requiresmore than mere negligence, an act need not be“intentional” to be “volitional.”

See

United States v

Trinidad-Aquino

,259 F.3d 1140, 1146(9th Cir. 2001) (construing crimes of violenceunder18 U.S.C. § 16 as “not…requiring specificintent, but rather merely

a volitional act equivalent to recklessness

.” (emphasis added)). Thus, themere fact the Shooter did not

intentionally

shootthe Plaintiff or fire the gun does not mean she didnot act

volitionally

. Second, even if the Shooter did not intentionally fire the gun, a third party isnot required to intentionally discharge a gun before the PLCAA will apply. The preemption istriggered if the injury is caused by “a volitional actthat constituted a criminal offense.”15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)(v). Apart from firing the gun, theShooter certainly took other volition acts that werecriminal

*20

offenses, such as intentionally taking possession of the gun and pulling the trigger whilein a vehicle with the gun pointed at another person.

See

18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A);A.R.S. §13-3111(A);A.R.S. § 13-1201(A). Under thePLCAA’s terms, these actions alone are sufficientto trigger preemption of Plaintiff’s product liabilityclaims. As such, it is clear to the Court that by her possession and behavior while in possession of thehandgun, the Shooter took multiple volitionalactions that constituted criminal offenses.

Having construed the PLCAA’s general preemption provision and the PLCAA’s productliability exception, the Court finds the PLCAAdoes bar Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendantwhere, as here, the shooting is caused by criminal possession and recklessness of a third party. Thus,if the PLCAA is constitutional, Plaintiff’s claimsmust be dismissed.

D. The Constitutionality of the PLCAA

Plaintiff argues that if the PLCAA bars his claimsthen the act itself is unconstitutional. Specifically,Plaintiff argues the act violates his rights to due process and equal protection under the FifthAmendment. (Doc. 21 at 15-17); U.S. Const.amend. V. Plaintiff also argues that the statuteviolates the Tenth Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution by infringing on the states’lawmaking authority and attempting to dictatewhat branch of government is used to developstate law. (

. at 13-14); U.S. Const. amend. X.The Ninth Circuit has previously considered theconstitutionality of the PLCAA.

Ileto

,565 F.3d at1140-44. To the extent the

Ileto

opinion addressesor applies to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court is bound by that ruling.

Hart v

Massanari

,266 F.3d 1155,1170-71 (9th Cir. 2001). “This includes not onlythe rule announced, but also the facts giving rise tothe dispute, other rules considered and rejected,and the views expressed in response to any dissentor concurrence.”

1. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Challenge

The Court is bound to rule against Plaintiff’s FifthAmendment claims because binding Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses his challenge. Plaintiff bringstwo challenges under the Fifth Amendment, one based on due process and one based on equal protection.

*21

(Doc. 21 at 15-17.)

Plaintiff’s due process claim alleges that “thePLCAA violates the Due Process Clause of theFifth Amendment because it eliminates anyremedy for victims of gun industry negligence likeCarlos.” (

. at 15.) However, the Ninth Circuithas held that the “the PLCAA d[oes] notviolate…procedural due process…[and] does notcompletely abolish Plaintiffs’ ability to seek redress,”

Ileto

,565 F.3d at 1142, and the Court is bound by this ruling. Further, even were the Courtnot so bound, Plaintiff’s claim is plainly factuallyincorrect. Plaintiff may still pursue remediesagainst the owner of the gun and the actual shooter who caused him harm; he simply has elected notto.

12Travieso v. Glock Inc. No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2021)

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is similarlyunavailing. Plaintiff argues the PLCAA violatesthe Equal Protection Clause “by creating a systemin which victims of gun industry negligence mayrecover damages in states with legislationcodifying liability standards, but not in statesrelying on common law.” (Doc. 21 at 17.) Plaintiff seems to concede that rational basis scrutinyapplies to this challenge, but argues the PLCAAnonetheless can’t pass rational basis scrutiny. (

.)Plaintiff’s argument is both factually incorrect, and barred by Ninth Circuit precedent. The argumentis factually incorrect because the PLCAA barsliability for common law theories of liability evenwhen those standards have been codified.

See Ileto

,565 F.3d at 1137 (“the PLCAA preempt[s]…theories of liability even in jurisdictions…that have codified such causes of action.”). Regardless, Plaintiff’s argument is barred by precedent because the Ninth Circuit has previously held that the PLCAA passes rational basis review.

. at 1140 (“There is nothingirrational or arbitrary about Congress’ choicehere[.]”).In light of the above, the Court finds that thePLCAA is not unconstitutional under the FifthAmendment’s due process or equal protectionrequirements.

2. Plaintiff’s Tenth Amendment Challenge

Plaintiff also argues that the PLCAA violates theTenth Amendment because “because it purports to bar certain common law claims against guncompanies, while allowing identical claims thatinvolve a statutory violation.” (Doc. 21 at 13.)Plaintiff

*22

alleges the Act is an “attempt bycongress [

sic

] to dictate how a state will make itslaw…[by] dictat[ing] which branch of governmentmust be used to make liability law applicable tothe firearms industry.” (

.) According to Plaintiff “[t]his scheme violates principles of federalismenshrined in the Tenth Amendment [because]Congress has no authority to …deprive a state of its right to choose which branch of government touse to make law[.]” (

. at 14.) However, theCourt finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive because the PLCAA was passed pursuant toCongress’s enumerated power to regulate interstatecommerce.

The PLCAA does not violate the TenthAmendment because it is a constitutional exerciseof Congress’s specifically enumerated power toregulate interstate commerce, and Plaintiff has notshown the act commandeers state officials. TheTenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers notdelegated to the United States by the Constitution,nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved tothe States respectively, or to the people.” U.S.Const. amend. X. However, when Congress passesa law pursuant to the enumerated powersdelegated to it under the Constitution, the onlyapplicable limitation of the Tenth Amendment isits anti-commandeering doctrine.

City of New York v

Beretta U

Corp

.,524 F.3d 384, 396-97 (2dCir. 2008) (citing

Printz v

United States

,521 U.S.898, 933 (1997);

New York v

United States

,505U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992));

Just a little reminder to all those Good Folks out there!

Post author By Grumpy
Post date May 7, 2021
No Comments on Just a little reminder to all those Good Folks out there!

All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

How Hard Is It to Get a Concealed Handgun License in Portland? Let Me Count the Ways. BY JEFF REYNOLDS

Post author By Grumpy
Post date May 6, 2021
No Comments on How Hard Is It to Get a Concealed Handgun License in Portland? Let Me Count the Ways. BY JEFF REYNOLDS

AP Photo/Michael Hill

I’ve put off getting my concealed handgun license for many years. Inertia, ill-defined fears about being “in the system,” and a general lack of urgency all contributed. Additionally, living in Multnomah County, just outside of Portland, I have exactly zero faith that our Maoist, Soros-backed, antifa-loving district attorney Mike Schmidt would offer me a fair trial should the time arise that I need to use my 2nd Amendment rights. After all the shenanigans 2020 visited upon us, however—especially in Portland—I decided the time was right (even though I lost all my handguns in a tragic boating accident).

So, the day after Christmas 2020, I filled out the application, paid the $55 course fee, and passed the online handgun safety course required for the license. I knew that skyrocketing demand meant I was in for a much longer wait time than normal, and so I chuckled slightly and just sort of accepted it when the system told me my appointment to get my license would be in April 2021.

In the interim, my family and I had decided to move to Florida after the current school year ends. We became occupied with house-hunting, packing, selling a second property, and arranging contractors to make repairs to get our main home on the market. A whole series of columns will follow detailing why we decided to bail on Oregon, but suffice it to say that the kids needed real school, our entire family needed relief from pandemic fascism, and we have grown weary of big-city life.

This will become important in a moment.

Again, I had no real sense of urgency, and I’ve gone this long without my concealed handgun license, so I didn’t sweat the wait too much. It did make me wonder, though, what if you’re in a higher-crime neighborhood watching the crime rate skyrocket throughout Portland, as response times increase in direct proportion to how much city council has defunded the police? What if you’re in an abusive relationship, need a restraining order, and know that the police can’t protect you? What if you are worried about exploding gang violence? Any number of scenarios could give a Portland resident pause to consider carrying a handgun.

Anyway, my appointment rolled around on April 21 at 11 a.m. I showed up at the Penumbra Kelly Building, home of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), a few minutes early. Even though I’ve lived through nightly riots in Portland, I was still taken aback at the appearance of the building. Plywood covering EVERYTHING. I walked in, and the lobby was completely unlit. I looked up and saw plywood covering all the windows.

It looked like the working definition of dystopia.

I took their COVID-19 quiz and had my temperature taken. After a few minutes, the two ladies who process the paperwork arrived. Since I had arrived first, I was up. I walked into the little room to get my picture taken, get fingerprinted, etc.

We made small talk: “Boy, you guys are backed up, huh?”

“Yeah,” one of them replied, “it’s been pretty busy.”

“Seems like a nice place to work, at least, with all the plywood …” That engendered a snicker from both.

The one lady finished taking my digital fingerprints, and the other took my $65 license fee. I was now into this thing for $120, the cost of the exam and the fee for the license. Next up, they took my picture for my concealed handgun license.

I got my receipt, my ID, and my certificate of course completion back. What the clerk said next caused me to double-take, as if I hadn’t heard her correctly.

“Ok now, this is not a license.”

“I—I’m sorry?”

“This is not a license. You won’t be receiving your license today.”

This, as you may imagine, was news to me.

“Yeah,” she said to me, “we still have to run the background check, and process your paperwork.”

I blinked back at her, disbelievingly.

“It could be up to 90 days.”

Now, mind you, I’ve legally purchased an undetermined amount of firearms in the not-so-distant past (all of which, I must reiterate, I tragically lost in a boating accident). When things got super busy, around Christmas time, my background check took up to an hour or two.

The MCSO told me that the entire process, from application, to safety certification, to license issue, will stretch from December 2020 to around July. Eight months.

Good thing Portland hasn’t given anyone a reason to need a concealed handgun over the past year and a half.

Remember, I had decided in the interim to pack my family up and move to Florida. This will happen sometime in June. Here’s the ironic thing. It’s almost certain that my new Oregon concealed handgun license will need to be forwarded to my new address out of state if and when it is finally issued. It’s also entirely possible that I will get my Florida license well before my Oregon license arrives.

A few things have run through my head about this whole ordeal. One: I know this is liberal deep-blue Portland. The clerks in the office reported, however, that they’ve seen unprecedented demand. The number of customers in the lobby confirm this, and the clerks also tell me they have appointments all day, every day. There must be thousands of Multnomah County residents applying for concealed handgun licenses, for myriad obvious reasons.

Two, and much more sinister: the conspiracy part of my brain can’t believe the Multnomah County Sheriff hasn’t used the pandemic and the nightly riots and the exploding demand as excuses to slow-walk CHL applications. That’s just how the politics of this county work.

A variety of forces have converged to make acquiring your concealed handgun license in Portland as onerous as possible. Just another in the pile of reasons to move out of Multnomah County and migrate to somewhere that doesn’t make it so difficult.

A Victory! All About Guns Allies Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

John Cornyn Introduces National Concealed Carry Reciprocity in Senate (its not going to happen, but it is a great sign that the fight has just begun)

Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced national reciprocity legislation for concealed carry in the Senate on Thursday.

The NRA-backed bill would treat concealed carry licenses like driver’s licenses, ensuring permit holders could drive state-to-state and have their concealed permit recognized as valid.

BREAKING NEWS: NRA-Backed National Concealed Carry Reciprocity introduced in the U.S. Senate by Sen. @JohnCornyn (R-TX).

6:37 PM · Apr 29, 2021

Cornyn released a statement coinciding with the introduction of the legislation, saying, “This bill focuses on two of our country’s most fundamental constitutional protections — the Second Amendment’s right of citizens to keep and bear arms and the Tenth Amendment’s right of states to make laws best-suited for their residents. I look forward to working with my colleagues to advance this important legislation for law-abiding gun owners nationwide.”

Breitbart News noted Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC) introduced national reciprocity legislation in the House on January 4, 2021.

Hudson’s legislation, the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act (HR38), treats concealed carry licenses like driver’s licenses as well, recognizing the license from one state as valid in the other 49.

Hudson released a statement upon introducing HR38:

Our Second Amendment rights do not disappear when we cross state lines, and H.R. 38 guarantees that. The Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2021 is a common sense solution to provide law-abiding citizens the right to conceal carry and travel freely between states without worrying about conflicting state codes or onerous civil suits.

“I am especially proud to have such widespread and bipartisan support for this measure and will work with my colleagues to get this legislation over the finish line,” he concluded.
AWR Hawkins is an award-winning Second Amendment columnist for Breitbart News and the writer/curator of Down Range with AWR Hawkins, a weekly newsletter focused on all things Second Amendment. He is the political analyst for Armed American Radio. Follow him on Twitter: @AWRHawkins. Reach him directly at awrhawkins@breitbart.com. Sign up to get Down Range at breitbart.com/downrange.

All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

In their dreams!!!

A Victory! All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

Gun control is a lost cause. Come despair with me. Ross K. Baker

Post author By Grumpy
Post date April 29, 2021
No Comments on Gun control is a lost cause. Come despair with me. Ross K. Baker

Let’s start with the fact that there are enough guns in this country so that every man, woman and child could have one. Add to that a couple of Supreme Court decisions that enshrine gun ownership alongside freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as constitutionally hallowed rights. On top of that is the fact that even such modest efforts at the state level to limiting access to guns to people deemed dangerous to themselves have proved ineffective. No better example of this is the fact that the Indiana “red flag” law designed to keep guns out of the hands of mentally unstable people only temporarily delayed the killer of eight people in Indianapolis from getting his hands on the weapon used to take their lives. Gun control advocacy stands high in the ranks of lost causes and futile campaigns alongside legitimating polygamy and scrapping the national anthem for something more singable.

The brief flicker of hope that somehow the financial problems of the National Rifle Association, and the profligate spending of members’ dues by one its top executives, might stifle the effectiveness of the opposition to even the most modest efforts to control firearms or reduce their lethality became an iridescent dream — and seemed to prove that the organization itself was never much of a factor in blocking gun-control legislation.

What kills such efforts in Congress, even in the wake of the unspeakable slaughter of the innocents at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, is the recognition in the minds of politicians that there are voters in their states and districts who are Second Amendment absolutists, whether they be the kind of people who shoot at targets for practice or those who might shoot at people because of malice or derangement.

States’ gun laws

So strong is the constituency for firearms ownership in Congress that a law is on the books immunizing gun manufacturers and sellers from lawsuits arising out of the use of their products for mass shootings and mayhem on smaller scale. It is the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act that became effective in 2005.

The response of the gun industry has been, from a business standpoint, quite rational: Sellers give the consumers what they demand. The only limit is that they cannot manufacture or sell fully automatic machine guns.

Guns on Feb. 5, 2013, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

As we have seen in the case of Indiana’s modest efforts to keep firearms out of the hands of potentially dangerous people, enforcement is easily circumvented, and even the strictest state laws are at the mercy of the lax or nonexistent limits on gun ownership in adjacent states.

My own state of New Jersey with some of the strictest gun ownership laws in the nation is located adjacent to Pennsylvania, a state with few limits on who can get access to a gun. Worse, perhaps, is the fact that Interstate 95 runs up the spine of the state and has been referred to as “the iron highway” for the brisk traffic in guns being brought into New Jersey from states to the south.

Mother to mother: A woman who lost her child to gun violence makes a plea to Kamala Harris

The once plausible argument that gun ownership was somehow connected to membership in state militias was cast aside by a Supreme Court dominated by “originalists” who developed historical amnesia about the Founding Fathers’ dread of standing armies and preference for “a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” and declared that the only operative phrase in the Second Amendment was “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”.

No way to stop it

This interpretation of the amendment might, to some extent, be influencing the longest shot of all: the enlargement of the Supreme Court to redress the imbalance in the number of justices that endows conservatives with a solid voting majority. Congress can indeed enlarge the court, but that would take a statute that would require a supermajority of 60 votes, which is not currently available. It is doubtful, moreover, that even all 50 Democratic and independent senators would approve the enlargement.

Gun laws: As mass shootings mount, enacting stricter gun laws is the morally right thing to do

And this is where things stand: Daily, weekly, monthly massacres of sizable numbers of victims enabled by a patchwork of ineffective, indifferently enforced state laws, and the awesomely destructive firepower of many of the weapons used in these assaults.

Unbalanced, vengeful or politically motivated assailants armed, in many cases, with charismatic weapons patterned on those used by the military will continue to inflict death and grievous injury on innocent people. There is, effectively, no way to stop it.

Ross K. Baker is a distinguished professor of political science at Rutgers University and a member of USA TODAY’s Board of Contributors. Follow him on Twitter: @Rosbake1

You can read diverse opinions from our Board of Contributors and other writers on the Opinion front page, on Twitter @usatodayopinion and in our daily Opinion newsletter. To respond to a column, submit a comment to letters@usatoday.com.

All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

Supreme Court Grants Cert in Second Amendment Concealed Carry Case

Post author By Grumpy
Post date April 29, 2021
No Comments on Supreme Court Grants Cert in Second Amendment Concealed Carry Case

Supreme Court Grants Cert in Second Amendment Concealed Carry Case

Today the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear an NRA-backed case challenging New York’s restrictive concealed-carry-licensing regime. This sets the stage for the Supreme Court to affirm what most states already hold as true, that there is an individual right to self-defense outside of the home.

This case challenges New York’s requirement that applicants demonstrate “proper cause” to carry a firearm. New York regularly uses this requirement to deny applicants the right to carry a firearm outside of their home. The NRA believes that law-abiding citizens should not be required to prove they are in peril to receive the government’s permission to exercise this constitutionally protected right.

Speaking on the Court’s decision, Jason Ouimet, Executive Director of NRA-ILA said, “The Court rarely takes Second Amendment cases. Now it’s decided to hear one of the most critical Second Amendment issues. We’re confident that the Court will tell New York and the other states that our Second Amendment right to defend ourselves is fundamental, and doesn’t vanish when we leave our homes.”

In addition to ruling on this statute, this case will give the Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify the precedent that it has created surrounding the Second Amendment. It has been over a decade since the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense in District of Columbia v. Heller. In 2010, the Court also ruled that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right that applies to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago.

It is hard to overstate how important this case is. The decision will affect the laws in many states that currently restrict carrying a firearm outside of the home. NRA-ILA is working hard to defend your constitutional rights and is prepared to argue this case in order to protect the rights of Americans everywhere.

The case is called New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen.

All About Guns Anti Civil Rights ideas & "Friends"

BREAKING: ‘Draft’ of ATF Ghost Gun Rule By Keith Finch

Post author By Grumpy
Post date April 27, 2021
No Comments on BREAKING: ‘Draft’ of ATF Ghost Gun Rule By Keith Finch

D.C.-Attorney-General-Sues-Polymer80-Over-Kits-1.jpg

TheReload.com has a 107 page pdf that appears to be the current draft proposal of the ATF’s response to Biden’s requirement that they “do something” about Ghost Guns.

Read the whole draft – click this text.

In short, it appears they are drastically expanding the definition of what is a “frame or receiver” by saying, ‘well… in 1968 guns kinda usually had one receiver, so this whole notion that Glock and Sigs and AR’s have working parts housed in two receivers is blowing our minds a little…’

Under the GCA and implementing regulations, the term “firearm” includes:
“(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be
converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3); 27
CFR 478.11 (emphasis added). Although weapon parts kits in their unassembled,
incomplete, and/or unfinished state or configuration generally will not expel a projectile
by the action of an explosive at the time of sale or distribution, weapon parts kits that are
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive are “firearms” under the GCA. – Proposed Definition Change.

No, seriously. Page 5 and 6 of the draft is basically just saying that under older firearm designs picking the receiver was easier. They go onto say that the old regulations were “never meant to be exhaustive” so they can make up new ones. It then goes into how “newer” firearms like the AR-15 (whose origin starts a decade prior to the GCA so there is no reason they should have missed that development) don’t have parts that necessarily fit the definition of receiver but the regulatory bodies picked the part that best “fit” the definition of frame or receiver, usually the part that help many of the fire control components. But one part was designated the receiver and controlled as ‘the firearm’ under law.

It then goes on to highlight just how easy it is to make a unserialized receiver, which is legal to do, but that is now “untraceable” … which makes sense too, considering it was home built. They made it themselves, trace over. PG 11, 12, and 13 cover this.

The line I’m dying over is, “An accurate firearm description is necessary to trace a firearm…” yet when I gave an exact definitive description and serial number to law enforcement after a theft it was completely lost in the reporting by the time the second officer involved (that I interacted with) was talking to me to confirm. “Accurate” was clearly not a priority in that reporting.

ATF traces firearms found by law enforcement at a crime scene by first contacting the licensed manufacturer or importer marked on the frame or receiver who maintains permanent records of their manufacture or importation and disposition. Using the information obtained from those required records, ATF then contacts each licensed dealer or other licensee who recorded their receipt and disposition to locate the first unlicensed purchaser to help find the perpetrator or otherwise solve the crime.–PG 13

How many crimes are we confused on? Felon in possession is not predicated on a firearm having a serial number, it is that a working firearm was in the possession of the felon. Similar goes for homicide or aggravated assault/assault with a deadly weapon, how many of these are hanging out there as cold cases because a serial number dead ended an investigation?

Page 12 quotes the number of found “PMF’s” (Privately Made Firearms) that have been reported as being found in conjunction with crimes (23,906) but not one has been listed as having stalled an investigation, including the 325 connected to homicide/attempted homicide.

Isn’t that what we are worried about, that serial numbers missing are going to stump law enforcement? Doesn’t seem like they are very stumped if they’ve found so many of them in connection to crimes.

Then it goes into FFL A&D records, commonly known as ‘Bound Books’ these are the federally auditable inventory of an FFL, and PMF’s not having serial numbers means the rules are even more vague on whether or not a firearm can go into their book. They can, but no serial numbers are traditionally associated with much older guns (it happens, serial numbers were more about inventory tracking than criminal tracking) while these PMF’s are new production.

Serial numbers are required (and an 07/02 FFL) if someone or some company want to commercially build firearm inventory for sale. But selling a personal non-serialized firearm that wasn’t built for profit is kind of a *shrug* “nobody is really sure, do the best you can” *shrug again* situation when it comes to record keeping.

And so on and so forth…

Anyway, I have no verification the draft is authentic. It looks authentic. We saw this prior to the bump-stock public comment period and that draft was spot-on. So I’m guessing this is more of the same, it may even be a “testing the waters” type of “leak” *wink* to get public comment going prior to the actual DRAFT draft being publicly commented upon in an official sense.

I don’t know… but man do they love themselves some trace reports, by this reading.